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Abstract: 
The Twenty-First Century has seen increasing support for far-right authoritarian policies across 
Europe, particularly in France. This paper identifies and explains the connection between the 
rising power of France’s far-right, populist party and the pervasive sentiments of Islamophobia 
through an examination of major theories, anxiety-producing events, and reactionary legal 
actions in France pertaining to the oppression of Muslims. It begins with an analysis of France’s 
colonial history and its lasting implications concerning the legitimacy of anti-Muslim rhetoric. 
Next, the paper analyzes the usage of terrorism as a framed threat by far-right politicians to 
promote authoritarian agendas. It then examines France’s unwillingness and inability to integrate 
Muslim immigrants into French society, predicated off of major threat perceptions associated 
with Muslims and Islam. Finally, the paper offers an understanding of how the greatest threat to 
France is not the electoral success of the Front National, but the historical implications 
concerning the increasingly normalized nature of policies supported by the FN. 
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Introduction I: Populism and Islamophobia in France 
 
On the 23rd of April, 2017, the nation of France held their presidential elections; in 
which no candidate gained a majority of the vote. This precipitated a runoff election on May 7th 
between the two forerunners. This election was particularly interesting because neither of the 
candidates came from the two centrist, established parties in France, the Parti Socialiste and Les 
Republicans. Instead, Emmanuel Macron, of his own new movement, En Marche, and Marine le 
Pen, the former head of the far-right populist, nationalist party, Le Front National (FN) beat the 
established candidates and faced off in the final election. The vote saw Macron instated as the 
new President of France by a substantial majority of 66.1% of the popular vote over Madame Le 
Pen’s 33.9%, solidly cementing his presidency at the time.  However, despite receiving only half 1
as many votes as Macron, Le Pen’s success drew significant concern from the international 
community as France, a nation known for its socialism and its foundations of liberty and 
equality, had not experienced such extensive support for xenophobic populism throughout the 
existence of the Fifth Republic. In fact, not since the Vichy Dictatorship of World War II had 
France permitted far-right politics to garner as much support as the FN did in 2017. 
The rise of the FN, now known as the Rassemblement National, is one story among many 
parallel trends in other western democratic nations as the 21st century sees a renewed rise in 
power among nationalist populist parties.  The populist parties of Europe including the Golden 2
1 ​Sean Clarke and Josh Holder, “French presidential election May 2017 – full second round results and analysis,” 
The Guardian​, May 26, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/may/07/french-presidential-election-results-latest​. 
2 For the purposes of this paper, the Rassemblement National will be referred to by its former abbreviation, the FN. 
4 
Dawn, the Austrian Freedom Party, and Alternative for Germany, have experienced increases in 
support, political power and influence over the course of the 21st century.  This rise in populism 3
comes from several major issues, including economic stagnation, anti-European rhetoric, 
national pride, and anti-immigration sentiments. In particular, populist parties of the 21st century 
have increasingly gravitated towards anti-Islamic rhetoric, in keeping with the concerns voiced 
by the masses on issues of economic job market saturation, threats of violence in the form of acts 
of terror, and inability or perhaps refusal to assimilate and integrate the influx of Muslim 
immigrants and refugees.   4
This introductory chapter serves two purposes. First, this chapter explains the concepts of 
populism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and xenophobic populism, drawing broader connections 
between them. This is to provide a better understanding of the assertions and analyses made 
throughout the paper. A description of populism will be followed by a discussion on the theory 
of ‘othering’ and xenophobia. An analysis of Islamophobia will then follow before explaining 
how xenophobia and Islamophobia in particular can be used as fuel for populist movements. 
Second, this chapter will provide a roadmap for the rest of the paper. This will include a brief 
walkthrough of the major issues addressed in each chapter and their primary purpose in the 
paper. 
 
 
 
3 ​Richard A. DeAngelis, “A Rising Tide for Jean-Marie, Jorg, and Pauline? Xenophobic Populism In Comparative 
Perspective,” ​Australian Journal of Politics and History​, (2003): 77. 
4 Sa​bri Ciftci, “Islamophobia and Threat Perceptions: Explaining Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West,” ​Journal of 
Muslim Minority Affairs​ 32, no. 3 (2012): 293. 
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Concepts and Theories 
Populism 
This paper focuses on the rise of populism as a political force in France, but what exactly 
is populism? Classical populism can be defined as a political movement which is perceived as 
anti-elite, anti-establishment, anti-immigration, and nationalistic, and which claims to be 
representing the underrepresented.  Populism has always had some level of support in 5
democratic nations, especially from individuals looking for someone to blame for their poor 
situations in life. Populism is supported particularly by ethnic ‘in-groups’ and the unemployed, 
who see ‘anti-party’ populism as a way for them to be heard in politics. Populism has become a 
much discussed phenomenon in recent years due to its rising prominence both inside and outside 
of France. The most common example of populist rhetoric success must be President Donald 
Trump’s victory in the 2016 U.S Presidential elections. His claims of being a Washington 
outsider, who was anti-immigration and thrived on chants like ‘drain the swamp,’ a clear call for 
anti-establishment and anti-elite policies, all depict an ideal populist candidate. Populism in the 
twenty-first century focuses on one policy almost universally across national lines: the 
anti-immigration issue. This paper proposes that xenophobia is the driving cause for populism’s 
success in this century. More specifically, for France, it is the fuel provided by Islamophobic 
sentiments that supports the FN and is, in turn, exacerbated by the framing of major issues in 
anti-Islamic images. 
 
5 DeAngelis, 82. 
6 
Xenophobia 
Xenophobia comes from the greek words ​xenos​ and ​phobos​ respectively meaning 
stranger and fear. It is by definition “the fear and hatred of strangers and foreigners or of 
anything that is strange or foreign.”  The existence of xenophobia is an inevitable side effect of 6
the humans experience. Humans instinctively pursue tribalistic group formations in the search of 
safety and collaboration to improve their opportunities to survive and thrive. Part of the process 
of group formation is the designation of non-members as out-group members. This 
differentiation is accompanied by a negative perception of the non-members as being inferior to 
the dominants group. The differentiations used to justify this divide take on many forms, 
including race, ethnicity, religion, language, culture, and technological capability.  
Humans who exhibit xenophobia have engaged in a process known as ‘othering,’ which 
involves the assessment of an individual or a group lying outside of your adopted ‘in-group’ as 
foreign, exotic, and in most cases threatening.  The ‘out-group’ which is created by these 7
associations is often judged to be inferior to members of the presiding ‘in-group’ and is 
deserving of mistreatment and distrust. Examples of xenophobic ‘othering’ are a constant 
presence in the history of man, and the presence of xenophobia has permitted human beings to 
engage in act of savagery against one another with the justification of their own superiority. In 
this paper, it is the existence of a particular brand of xenophobia which lies central to the 
explanation of the rise of populism in France. 
 
 
6 Merriam Webster Dictionary, “Xenophobia,” accessed February 16, 2019, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/xenophobia​. 
7 DeAngelis, 83. 
7 
Islamophobia 
While xenophobia more generally is a psychological reaction inherent in the process of 
‘othering,’ which humans naturally engage in during their creation of in-groups and out-groups, 
France’s brand of xenophobia focuses on the demonization and dehumanization of Muslims and 
their faith. Islamophobia is a form of “cultural racism,” and is derived from the West’s inability 
to accommodate non-Christian religious denominations in their societies.  While Islamophobia is 8
difficult to define as there are many elements that compose the fear felt towards Muslims as an 
outgroup, the Runnymede report, as reported by Sabri Ciftci, compiled eight major concerns and 
issues that are considered in the creations of sentiments of Islamophobia. In summary of these 
components, Islamophobia is derived from Western perceptions of the faith as a monolithic bloc 
which is different, inferior, and hostile towards the West.  Furthermore, “hostility to Muslims is 9
sen as natural or normal” and “is used to justify discriminatory practices toward Muslims and 
exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.”  The intensified process of ‘othering’ which 10
characterizes the treatment and perceptions of Muslims in European society has lead to 
significant divisions surpassing initial fears due to perceived threats which implant a prejudice in 
the minds of Europeans. It is also around Islamophobia that modern far-right populism derives 
its support. 
 
 
 
 
8 Ciftci, 294. 
9 Ibid., 295. 
10 Ibid., 295. 
8 
Xenophobic Populism 
Having examined the ideas of populism, xenophobia and Islamophobia, it is time to 
address the phenomenon affecting Europe, and more specifically France, in the twenty-first 
century. Xenophobic-populism refers to the form of populism demonstrated by the rising 
populist parties of this millenium.  While economic and security-based issues are staples of the 11
classical populist platform, the most recent wave of populism rose in power despite having 
solved issues of these natures in the cases of France, Austria, and Australia.  For the new wave 12
of populism, cultural resentment has surged as the driving force behind many successful populist 
movements.  13
This focus on cultural divisions is central to the platform of the FN and has been since its 
rebranding in the 1980s. “(The FN), is ​not​ behaviorally extremist or fully ‘anti-system,’ 
systematically statist, militarist, anti-democratic, violent, social Darwinist, or openly ‘racist’ 
defiantly using skin colour as a moral category separating the good from the bad.”  Instead, the 14
FN has risen to prominence primarily using the sentiments of xenophobia which have been 
embedded in the French culture concerning the French Muslim immigrant population and their 
descendents.  
 
 
 
Road Map 
11 DeAngelis, 76. 
12 Ibid., 75. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 88. 
9 
This examination of the connection between Islamophobia and populism in the Fifth 
Republic of France contains one more introductory chapter, three body chapters, and a 
conclusion. The secondary introductory chapter will examine the primary populist party of 
France, the Front National (FN), looking into their history, their ideology, their voting bloc and 
the timeline of their successes and failures since their inception in 1972. The next chapter, and 
first body chapter, will examine the historical context of Islamophobia in France through the lens 
colonialism and postcolonial identity. The second body chapter will advance to the 21st century 
with an analysis of the impact of terrorism on political decisions as a result of Islamophobia and 
the framing of terror by the media and the FN. The final body chapter will examine the European 
Refugee crisis and France’s failure to properly integrate and assimilate Muslim refugees and 
immigrants. 
 
Introduction II: The Front National 
The second introduction, focusing on the Front National, provides context for the rise of 
French populism beyond the framework presented on xenophobia and populism more generally. 
Beyond other western European populist parties, the FN has succeeded in garnering large 
amounts of support from the French populace and has been dynamic and flexible in their 
recruitment of support, diversifying their party and crossing traditional party-line boundaries. 
While the efforts of Jean-Marie Le Pen will be addressed, the primary focus of this chapter will 
be on the platform of the party under the leadership of the current president of the party, Marine 
Le Pen. Looking at her positions on Islam, as well as the positions and sentiment demonstrated 
10 
by the stalwarts of the party, this chapter will contextualize the broader linkages between 
xenophobia or rather Islamophobia, and populism, with a focus on France’s unique case. 
 
French Colonialism 
The French Imperial Legacy has persisted to modern times by framing the French 
perception of Islam and the large minority Muslim population in France. The processes of 
colonization and decolonization have impressed upon the French psyche a sense of superiority 
over the Muslim Algerians, paired with a fear of their capacity for violence and their inability to 
coexist with the values of French republicanism. The Le Pen family often calls upon their 
constituents’ desire for power and superiority by referencing back to the times of power and 
imperial domination. France has a long and culturally grounded history which remained 
relatively homogenous for generations. Idealization of French identity through their cultural 
values of Liberte, Egalite, and Fraternite, along with their commitment to secularism or laicite, 
has created a society which is prone to accepting the failings of Islam and Muslims, and 
perceiving them as a genuine threat to France and her ideals. 
The French experience with colonialism has also created demographic changes with the 
increased introduction of migrants into France from two major ideological backgrounds; the 
pieds-noirs​ settlers of Algeria, whose history of superiority and dominance in the territory 
cemented certain prejudices in their culture, and the Algerian Muslims who began arriving in 
greater numbers following the Algerian Revolution, initially as a source of labor. This chapter 
will set up the historical context which has permitted the FN’s extreme-right views to enter the 
French political discourse under the guise of legitimate defense of French republican ideals, 
11 
explaining the background for modern responses to issues of Muslim immigration and Islamic 
terrorism. 
 
Exacerbation of Islamophobia from the 2015-2016 terrorist attacks 
The second body chapter of this paper will return to modern events to demonstrate how 
the recent acts of terrorism perpetrated by Islamic Fundamentalists in 2015 and 2016 have 
exacerbated tensions in France and affected political affiliation and participation through the 
introduction of mass fear and anger. After demonstrating how the underlying tensions between 
French ideology and Islam came into being in the previous chapter, this chapter will demonstrate 
the ability and willingness of the media and the politicians of France to add to the politicization 
of terrorism. Terrorism on its own is not a framed type of threat, meaning that in its own 
existence, it is able to promote anxiety in a national population simply by reminding individuals 
of their own mortality and reviving fears of repeated acts of terrorism.  However, while the act 15
of terrorism itself can cause anxiety without any political rhetoric, the threat of terrorism can 
easily be co-opted by political parties as a major security issue and transformed into a framed 
threat to society.  16
With France’s past with Algerian terrorism from the 50s until the 90s being framed as a 
product of Islamic teachings, far-right sentiments in France are better capable of manipulating 
public anxiety and fear by giving them a scapegoat in these stressing times. The provision of a 
scapegoat on which to focus public unrest is by definition one of the primary features of a 
15 ​Bethany Albertson and Shana Kushner Gadarian, ​Anxious Politics : Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening 
World​, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 117. 
16 Ibid. 
12 
populist movement’s tactics.  And while research in France has demonstrated that the impacts of 17
terrorism do not change the public’s political leanings concerning non-security issues like 
socio-economic reform, the results of studies conducted by Sylvain Brouard and Pavlos 
Vasilopoulos point towards evidence that acts of terrorism in France have sparked a shift towards 
support for right-wing authoritarian policies regarding security measures, even at the expense of 
civil liberties.  This shift has been demonstrated not only among the general public of France 18
but in the actions of the government at the time. This is particularly interesting, because the 
French government in charge during the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016 was a socialist 
government under the leadership of Francois Hollande. Through an analysis of the framing of 
acts of terrorism by the media, the general reactions of the public concerning information 
seeking, political participation, and shifts in political support for security measures, this chapter 
will seek to demonstrate how the FN was able to co-opt fears of terrorism to normalize their 
rhetoric and promote increased authoritarian security policies while garnering future support for 
their party. 
 
A Clash of Cultures: The French Republican Response to Muslim Migrants 
The final chapter will focus on the usage of Muslim immigration as a scapegoat by the 
FN. One of the common themes connecting the populist parties of Europe today is their shared 
emphasis on classic anti-immigration rhetoric. The xenophobic populism which covers Europe’s 
states feeds on nationalistic xenophobic sentiments, proclaimed in large part by the unemployed 
white christians and catholics of Europe. With that in mind, this chapter seeks to understand the 
17 DeAngelis, 82. 
18 Vasilopoulos, 102. 
13 
various threats perceived to be posed by Muslim migrants in France, looking first at the arrival of 
migrants in the twentieth century as foreign workers; dealing with how they were treated upon 
settling in France. And second, looking at how France has been affected by, and handled, the 
European Refugee Crisis which began in 2015 and has resulted in an influx of hundreds of 
thousands of Syrian and other Middle Eastern refugees flooding into France and the rest of 
Europe.  
The Muslim immigrants who have made it to France have always been treated with some 
deal of suspicion and apprehension, in large part thanks to the framing placed upon them by the 
far-right in France, who has long viewed Muslims as a realistic threat to job security and 
personal wellbeing, as well as a symbolic threat to French republicanism and French cultural 
identity.  
Populism has been on the rise in western democracies across the globe but there have 
been few countries in which the movement has gained as much traction as in France. This paper 
will seek to prove that the success of the Front National, a xenophobic, anti-immigrant, populist 
party has experienced such extensive success and support from the French population due to 
engrained Islamophobic sentiments predicated upon perceived threats posed by Muslims dating 
back to French colonialism. More recently, the FN has cemented its legitimacy as an acceptable 
party in French politics by framing modern issues of unemployment and terrorism as an issue of 
security and immigration policy failure. In doing so, the FN utilizes exacerbating factors of 
Islamophobia such as terrorism to fuel their mission by contributing to the already growing 
Islamophobic sentiment in turn with their xenophobic, fear-based rhetoric. It is this symbiotic 
relationship that will be assessed and proven throughout this paper. 
14 
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Introduction II: Le Front National 
 
Having addressed the relevant political theories for this paper including populism, 
xenophobia, Islamophobia, and xenophobic populism, it remains for this paper to ground the 
following discussion in concrete terms. While populism can take many forms and is not 
demonstrated solely by the success of a single political party, France’s increasing support of 
populism will be examined in large part through the rise of Le Front National (FN). The FN is 
France’s far-right, extremist, nationalist, populist party which advocates for anti-immigration 
policies and a culturally homogenous definition of French national identity. For the purposes of 
much of the history on the FN, this chapter will reference Daniel Stockemer, whose historical 
accounts and analysis of the FN’s rise to prominence, their policies, and their constituencies, has 
proven invaluable in the analysis presented throughout this paper. 
In the years following the Second World War, French society was vehemently opposed to 
far-right political sentiments. Their internationally perceived failure under the fascist dictatorship 
of the Vichy Regime shamed the image of the French Republic, and most were afraid to see any 
resurgence of openly racist, xenophobic, far-right political agendas. It was not until the Algerian 
Revolution that far-right rhetoric reappeared in political discourse, and decades more before any 
central political party was successfully formed around those beliefs.  It was in this environment 19
that the Front National (FN) was created under the presidency of Jean-Marie Le Pen, whose 
racist and bigoted rhetoric would define the party for decades to come. 
19 Daniel Stockemer, ​The Front National in France: Continuity and Change Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine 
Le Pen​, (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017): 7. 
16 
Created in 1972, the FN emerged in France during a period of time represented by the 
birth of the new Fifth Republic and the inability of the extreme-right to form anything 
resembling a unified party.  While the Algerian Revolution enabled far-right politicians to once 20
again participate in the political discourse, no significant single-party was able to form to 
represent these sentiments up on the extreme-right side of the political spectrum.  Even with the 21
formation of an extreme-right, populist party, support was not immediately forthcoming for 
populist rhetoric. Before becoming a prominent party, the FN underwent a period of time defined 
as the “crossing of the desert” by Jean-Marie.  The party failed to break into principal party 22
politics for the first decade of its existence. This was likely thanks to the various personalities 
which defined the FN in its early days, some of which touted openly fascist ties with the Vichy 
regime and the Nazi party.  Later in the 1981 presidential elections, “Le Pen failed to receive the 23
500 signatures required to run in the 1981 presidential contest.”  This dismal beginning to the 24
party came to a close soon afterwards. 
Daniel Stockemer proposes several changes in France which might have reflected the rise 
of the Front national to the center of the political discourse in the 1980s. One of the structural 
changes proposed being the heightened anxiety of immigration brought on by the lax position of 
the presiding socialist government under Francois Mitterrand and by the shift in proportionality 
of the backgrounds of the immigrants.  Whereas immigrants to France had historically been 25
predominantly from European backgrounds, the 1980s experienced a shift toward a North 
20 Ibid., 10. 
21 Ibid., 9. 
22 Ibid., 13. 
23 Ibid., 15. 
24 Ibid., 13. 
25 ​Jens Rydgren, ​The Populist Challenge: Political Protest and Ethno-nationalist Mobilization in France​, (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2004): 120. 
17 
African-heavy migrant pool which had increased in size significantly since the mid-1940s to the 
point that 38.5% of all immigrants were of North African origin by 1982.  This shift in visibility 26
of North Africans, and by extension Muslims, in France led the FN to rebrand itself as the 
foremost part on issues of immigration and security.  
The mounting success of the party increased with the change in leadership on January 16, 
2011, when Marine Le Pen won the presidency of the FN from her father and instituted changes 
to the rhetoric of the party.  looking to present a less racist public appearance while persisting 27
with the severity of their anti-immigrant rhetoric. While Marine succeeded in removing most of 
the anti-semitic and overtly racist rhetoric from the party’s leadership, she continued to voice 
Islamophobic sentiments. 
The other major change to occur with the transition of power to Marine Le Pen is that of 
increased legitimacy for the party as a defender of republican values. Jean-Marie Le Pen began 
the shift away from rampant extremism with slogans expressing solidarity with the people of 
France. The populist element of the party was formed to express this affiliation with republican 
values. However, Jean-Marie’s anti-semitic comments in the late-1980s hurt their image 
significantly, and while support continued to grow, the image of the FN as a republican party 
was momentarily tarnished. 
 
Major Ideologies 
As with most populist parties, the FN has focused much of their identity around a 
ethnocentric-view of nationhood. Supporters of the FN believe that French identity, or the right 
26 Stockemer, 14. 
27 Ibid., 24. 
18 
to be French is not something that individuals can obtain simply through the naturalization 
process. Rather than allowing ‘soil’ to determine the legitimacy of one’s ‘Frenchness,’ the FN 
has often expressed the belief that one must merit French identity through complete adherence to 
her values and cultural identity.   28
The FN has always been portrayed as an anti-immigration party, and they have acted to 
perpetuate this depiction. Under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the FN touted the slogans 
La France est pour les français​, or “France and French first.”  These chants evoked French 29
republican sentiments by framing many issues face by the French population as a direct attack by 
the growing Muslim migrant minority against French republican values. Beyond the symbolic 
nature spouted as the impending ‘Islamification’ of France and of Europe more broadly, Le Pen 
and the FN have framed on the immigration issue as posing a genuine threat to the job security of 
the average French citizen.  
In the 1980s the FN rebranded away from their historical focus on xenophobia and other 
forms of traditional far-right extremism to embrace a new populist image. This transition came in 
tandem with the decision of many Muslim migrant workers who had initially served as a 
temporary workforce to rebuild France in the post-war era 
To harken back to the road map of the previous chapter, the FN has grown in power and 
influence because of the symbiotic relationship it has formed with French Islamophobia over the 
past four decades. In terms of colonialism, it was perceived threats of Islam fostered by the 
Algerian Revolution which permitted far-right political discourse to re-enter French politics. 
Rallying around anti-decolonization rhetoric, the founders of the FN, including Jean-Marie Le 
28 Peter Davies, ​The National Front in France : Ideology, Discourse and Power​ (London: Routledge, 1999): 64 
29 Rydgren, 175. 
19 
Pen entered into French politics and started their careers on the grounds of xenophobic sentiment 
and support for French superiority and cultural ideology. Furthermore, France’s colonial history 
permits the FN to claim that their actions, demanding the removal of Islam from public spaces 
and closing down immigration to Muslim asylum-seekers is not a xenophobic, extreme-right 
platform, but a platform in support of protecting French republican ideals of universalism and 
secularism from the threat of hyper-religious Muslims. 
Marine Le Pen is the most recent member of the Front National party of France to make 
headlines for her political achievements and positions of varying matters of policy but she is not 
the beginning of the far-right, populist party. Jean-Marie Le Pen created the party back in insert 
date, and under his guidance, the party developed a platform which claimed to defend the ‘true’ 
French citizens from a myriad of threats from abroad. These threats included unfair impositions 
from the European Union, economic disadvantages on international markets, incoming refugees 
particularly of Muslim origin, and other supposed problems originating from abroad. The Front 
National has always been a populist party; proclaiming itself to be the defender of the nations 
against all outside influences 
By understanding the history of the Front National, it becomes clear that their rise in 
popularity and support is not strictly a contemporary phenomena. Rather, the party has been 
growing in size and influence since its inception in 1972, and while recent events have allowed 
for transitions in their demonstrable influence away from regional success to the ballots of the 
executive branch, this is not the main way in which the FN has left the fringes of politics.  
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A History of Superiority: The Fall of France’s Colonial Empire 
Forward 
This chapter examines the impacts of France’s colonial and postcolonial past on 
continued sentiments of Islamophobia. The classic French national identity often focuses on 
universalism and secularism as the primary ideals of French republicanism. This cultural 
definition of national identity resonates most with white, catholic, conservative males, who often 
see themselves as the true inheritors of France’s legacy. Long before the 21st century, those 
adhering to this definition of national identity had trouble accepting foreign influences into 
French society, often asking them to assimilate into the French culture. Universalism values of 
liberte, egalite, and fraternite​ have been unquestionable ideals of the French culture for 
generations. Those who do not adhere to these ideals are often seen as un-French. While modern 
factors have undoubtedly contributed to increasing sentiments of Islamophobia in France, it is 
France’s imperial past which cemented her ideals and biases. The Islamophobia formed during 
this time has in turn provided far-right extremist populist rhetoric with a powerful cultural 
history from which to draw support. 
The process of colonization usually comes from the violent suppression of native peoples 
by foreign invaders who believe themselves to be more civilized and culturally, religiously, and 
ethnically superior. Colonization necessitates the creation of an artificial segregation between 
natives and foreigners which is fortified over time through geographic, economic and social 
separation.  Decolonization is the usually violent overthrow of the oppressive colonizers by a 30
politically and economically disadvantaged indigenous majority. When France went through the 
30 Ethan B. Katz, “An Imperial Entanglement: Anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and Colonialism,” (2018): 1190. 
22 
birth and death of her colonial empire, the increased amount of interactions with colonized 
natives fostered feelings of xenophobia. This was most prevalent in the case of French Algeria, 
where the French had seen their colony as a direct extension of France herself. Because of the 
violent revolution and the subsequent forced repatriation of the former settlers of French Algeria, 
known as the ​pieds-noirs​, France has since come to view Islam and Muslims as incompatible 
with the French identity. These perceptions persist to modern times and are present in the 
discourse of French identity and Islam’s place in contemporary France. 
 
Introduction 
While modern factors like terrorism and the European Refugee Crisis have exacerbated 
Islamophobia in France, contextual factors have also played a role in predisposing France to 
acceptance of far-right rhetoric, namely France’s colonial history and their transition to 
postcolonialism. France has old cultural roots, based on strict values of universalism known 
better as liberte, egalite, fraternite, and on their commitment to secularism: the mandated 
separation of church and state. France continues to adhere to the colonial-era idea of ​mission 
civilisatrice​, which states that anyone can become French as long as they adopt the values of 
French republicanism and abandon their previous cultural values.  However, during the period 31
of colonialism, French interactions with colonized natives sharpened negative stereotypes and 
lead to exacerbated distrust and dislike of sub-groups recognized as ‘others,’ namely Muslims. 
Because of this, Islamophobia has become ingrained in French cultural identity, which in turn 
has made France more susceptible to manipulation by far-right, populist politicians.  
31 Paul A. Silverstein, “The Context of Antisemitism and Islamophobia in France,” ​Patterns of Prejudice​ 42, no. 1 
(2008): 8. 
23 
Nations which have experienced the power of controlling a colony are often prone to 
lasting xenophobic sentiments for two reasons. First, in colonizing a territory, an imperial power 
engages in the oppression of those they designated as sub-human natives. This process is enacted 
with violence and disregard for the damage to the native population, and often serves to further 
cement feelings of superiority in the minds of the colonizers. Second, an imperial power will 
likely experience violent retaliation from the natives when the time for revolution arrives. This 
process of decolonization in turn exacerbates sentiments of fear of the ‘out-group’ as the former 
rulers are deprived of life and power. 
This chapter will look at existing theory on the implications of colonialism pertaining to 
the creation of xenophobic sentiments. It shall explain how the processes of colonization and 
decolonization breed lasting hatred and mutual fear between participants in a colonial system, 
due to the violence and segregation present in colonization. This chapter will demonstrate how 
these products of colonialism manifest culturally and politically in a  postcolonial state. The 
chapter will show that the colonization and liberation of Algeria exemplify the existing theory on 
said processes of colonization. Later, this chapter will examine the various forms of 
Islamophobic fallout that came from the decolonization of Algeria concerning France’s treatment 
of Muslims. This will be done through examinations of the changes in France’s demographics 
and cultural identity. Through this look at postcolonial Islamophobia, this chapter will show how 
the violence of the revolution fostered lasting resentment for Muslims and Islam, further 
augmenting the growing Islamophobic sentiments in France dating back to the Crusades. Finally, 
the link between the post-colonial French Islamophobia and the support for the populist FN party 
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will be explained through the FN’s manipulation of sentiments of fear, anger, and betrayal 
precipitated by the end of the colonial era. 
 
How Colonialism Fostered Xenophobia 
It is morbidly ironic and hypocritical that the majority of colonial powers in the twentieth 
century were liberal democracies from western Europe. Hypocritical, because France, Spain, 
Germany, the U.K and others acted in an uncivilized, barbaric manner in becoming colonial 
powers. To subjugate a territory, only the use of violence and the illiberal treatment of the 
conquered natives will suffice, and it is their self-justified racism which excuses them from the 
actions they commit.  European empires engaged in colonization with the moral justification 32
that they were spreading civilization to the ‘​Oriental’​ barbarians of the southern hemisphere.  33
This justification, stemming from feelings of racial superiority and religious mandate, enabled 
European colonizers to perpetrate extensive violence and draft legal systems which 
institutionalized segregation between Europeans and non-Europeans.  
The process of colonization was brutish and violent, often resulting in breaches of ethics 
and even genocide. In his discourse on Colonialism, Aime Cesaire depicts colonization as the 
antithesis of civilization for, in being a colonizing power, the colonizers become desensitized to 
the violent atrocities carried out against the colonized natives who they are taught to treat as 
savages.  He defines colonization as the “bridgehead in a campaign to civilize barbarism, from 34
which there may emerge at any moment the negation of civilization.”  This refers to the 35
32 Katz, 1190. 
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transformation which occurred among ‘civilized’ peoples when they resorted to the process of 
‘othering.’ To subjugate a native people and transform them into an efficient workforce, 
colonizers deprived natives of many rights granted to citizens of the state. The colonizer often 
viewed the natives as a morally obligated target for conquering under the will of God. Theorists 
like Renan stated that civilized, Christian Europeans had a moral obligation to bring about 
economic prosperity and industry to the lazy, savage, disreputable natives.  Often, this divine 36
sense of superiority resulted in actions which would be seen as crimes against humanity in the 
modern era.  
Once a territory was successfully conquered, the colonizers would perpetuate the 
segregation between the colonizer and the colonized, often through violent means. While this 
violence often lessens with time, the ability of the colonizer to brutalize and torture the natives 
for purposes of security and order is never eliminated as is done for ‘true citizens.’ Beyond the 
violence, colonizers viewed the indigenous population as a source of economic income which 
had previously been unharnessed due to the barbarian’s inherent laziness. As per their moral 
mandate, European colonizers would take charge of governing, manufacturing and industry, 
limiting the roles of the native majority to lesser occupations including agriculture and the 
provision of manual labor.  In doing so, foreigners destroyed the ecosystem of life and culture 37
which had previously existed in order to establish laws and systems in adherence with their own 
beliefs.  
Colonizing Africa and other regions also forced Europeans to engage with Muslims to a 
greater extent than ever before. European governments separated all involved parties by 
36 Ibid., 16. 
37 ​Ibid., 16. 
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ethnicity, religion, and place of origin, and in doing so, became more accustomed to specific 
traits which would form the basis of dangerous, divisive stereotypes in the future.  Groups like 38
the Jews and Berbers were separated from Muslims based on traits such as level of religious 
fervor and amenability to coexistence with the European settlers. Despite the differentiations, all 
colonized groups were treated as inferior beings deserving of foreign rule.  
The process of decolonization is alarmingly similar to the initial actions taken in 
colonization, the primary difference between the two being the identity of the perpetrator of 
violence and murder. Just as the colonizing invaders commit genocide in their efforts to 
subjugate those they see as inferior, so too do the natives resort to violence as a means of 
political change. Frantz Fanon describes the process of decolonization in certain terms as a 
violent one. “Decolonization is always a violent event.”  The violence of colonization which 39
was previously diverted from the colonizers through the exhibition of force by police must 
eventually cease as the natives recognize that the ones responsible for the theft of their freedom 
are not one another but the foreign invaders.  This change appears to be almost inevitable in 40
hindsight, as the oppression of a people must eventually exceed the limits of acceptance as has 
been demonstrated throughout history in cases from the American, to Kosovo, to Bosnia, to 
Algeria; the violent retaliation against lack of representation and exploitation is a natural 
occurrence. 
In order for a people who have been oppressed for generations to affirm to themselves 
their new state of freedom, it becomes necessary to completely supplant the previously existing 
rulers. As the process of colonization takes place through the usage of violence, it is natural for 
38 Katz, 1193. 
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the colonized to respond with similar methods. In responding with violence, the process of 
decolonization contributes further to the colonizer’s xenophobia towards their colonized subjects 
as they lose their previously enforced sense of superiority and safety to the violent methods of 
decolonization. Just as terrorism spreads anxiety and fear, violent decolonization precipitates an 
increased fear of the ‘other’ and a lost sense of security. This transforms the political leanings of 
the colonizer by promoting increased desire for security and increased fear of retribution for past 
actions.  
Colonialism exposed European powers to increased interactions with the indigenous 
peoples. In the case of the Muslims, this interaction served as a chance to differentiate between 
the Muslims and other factions of the natives.  This cementing of the reasons and stereotypes 41
which allowed the Europeans to justify their ‘othering’ of the Muslims plays a significant role in 
the persisting Islamophobia in Europe today. The ‘other,’ seen first as inferior, untrustworthy, 
and lazy, is transformed through violent actions into a subject of hatred, retribution, and fear. 
These two sides of xenophobia, disdain and fear, become embedded in a nation’s psyche. It is the 
cementation and fortification of the ‘us vs them’ dynamic which predisposes nations to negative 
biases going forward. This chapter will now demonstrate exactly how France experienced the 
transformative effects of colonialism, and how the resulting fear of Muslims predisposed them to 
the allure of populist rhetoric. 
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France and Algeria: How France’s Colonialism Fostered Islamophobia 
 
While Algeria was not the only colony that France created during its reign as an empire, 
it was the most important colony in terms of cultural influence, political involvement, and 
physical settlement of the territory by Europeans. The relationship between France and Algeria 
exemplifies the impacts of colonization and decolonization, and is perfect for analyzing the 
lasting impacts of decolonization on French cultural identity and exploring the perpetuation of 
Islamophobia. There are several reasons for this. The conquering of Algeria forced the French to 
refine their definitions and understandings of Muslims as different from other minority groups. 
Interactions with Algeria’s Muslim population prompted settlers to more fully assess Islam as a 
faith and culture, eventually designating it as a hostile ‘other,’ in relation to French republican 
values. Unlike other French territories, Algeria was considered an extension of France, governed 
not by a colonial governor with separate laws, but directly under the authority of the French 
government using French laws. Algeria also experienced greater levels of mass settlement than 
any other colony at that time. “The settler presence gave Algeria stronger political, social and 
cultural ties to France than those enjoyed by any other colony.”  French and other Europeans 42
settled in Algeria by the thousands, and due to the long age of of Algeria’s time as a colony, 
many generations of colonizers, or ​pieds-noirs​, came to see Algeria as their home. For these 
reasons, the loss of French Algeria impacted postcolonial France to a far greater degree than did 
the loss of other French colonies. Additionally, as the only violent decolonization process among 
42 Jennifer E. Sessions, ​By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria​ (New York: Cornell University 
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the former French colonies to take thousands of lives, the Algerian Revolution left lasting scars 
on the French populace and exacerbated negative perceptions of Islam as a threat to France.  43
The relationship of violence that has come to define the French-Algerian situation began 
with the invasion of Algiers by King Charles X in June of 1830.  The French army decimated 44
the resident Ottoman armed forces, who at the time controlled the territory, and proceeded to 
claim it as the newest French colony. This seizure of land was undertaken in large part as a 
means to promote nationalism and patriotism at home through the expansion of French power 
and influence.  The initial campaign to capture Algiers lasted three-weeks, but the years would 45
bear witness to hundreds of thousands of deaths perpetrated by the invading French military. The 
first forty years of French rule resulted in the deaths of more than 800,000 Algerians through 
military actions alone.  It is believed that nearly the same number also died as a result of 46
non-military intervention from the French and subsequent famines and droughts.  During this 47
time, French colonizers experienced increased interaction with Arab Muslims and began forming 
more concrete stereotypes of the people as a whole. Primarily, the French perceived the Muslims 
they encountered to exhibit both a hostile nature, and an inherently lazy position on life.  48
Notably, the prescription of abnormal aggression and violence was derived from the acts of 
barbarism experienced by French soldiers during the conquering of Algeria, as they reported 
Muslim men engaging in horrific acts of mutilations and beheadings of their enemies.  49
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The French saw the conquest of Algeria much as any other European power would. It 
was a territory to be taken for the glory of France, a target which would increase popular support 
and boost prestige and and the economy. France further justified the colonization of Algeria 
through claims of undertaking a “civilizing mission,” in an effort to bring culture and modernity 
to the savages of the African continent.  These justifications continue to bias French perception 50
of the period of colonialism, but that topic will be discussed further down in the paper. 
During the initial invasion, France portrayed the leaders of Algeria as Islamic fanatics 
and oriental despots.  This permitted Europeans to better justify the conquest and the resulting 51
hundreds of thousands of deaths as a necessary toll for the spread of civilization and the 
Christian faith to the backwards peoples of Algeria.  This justification enabled European 52
colonizers to assure themselves of their own moral duty, even while torturing and killing the 
native populations. This xenophobic sense of superiority existed long before the period of 
colonialism, but the physical act of conquest and the following treatment of the natives cemented 
the righteousness of the European position further throughout the colonial period.  
The French were able to justify actions perpetrated against the Arab majority in large part 
because of their internalized sense of morality and superiority. For the European colonizers, 
Muslims represented an inherently fanatical and zealous population, whose beliefs and traditions 
could never truly coexist with the various European models.  For the French, this was 53
particularly prevalent going forward as the French ideals of ​liberte, egalite, and fraternite​, as 
well as their belief in secularism stood in contrast with the teachings of Islam.  
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Part of the process of colonization included the rewriting of Algeria’s history to further 
justify the presence of the French. One author, Robert Randau, overwrote the exotic history of 
Algeria with depictions of pre-French Algeria as “characterized by utter squalor, infertile land, 
filth, and piracy.”  This rewriting of history continues to match with France’s tendency to define 54
their imperial conquests as a morally justified and mandated undertaking. While the massacre of 
an indigenous peoples for economic gain would frame French Algeria as a patriotic political 
move, the framing of the invasion and subsequent subjugation and oppression in terms of a 
morally mandated ​mission civilisatrice​ is more desirable.  This is significant, as that same 55
mission continues to play a role in the political definitions of French identity for those from the 
conservative or extreme-right side of the political spectrum. The adherence to ​mission 
civilicatrice​ also persists in the education of France’s youths, as demonstrated by the 2005 law 
which mandated the teaching of France’s positive role in their colonial efforts in history classes 
while ignoring the horrible actions taken.  56
It is untrue to say that the Algerian Revolution represented a new and spontaneous 
development in the history of Franco-Algerian relations. All throughout the history of French 
Algeria, ​colons​ had seen the Muslim population as a threat to their safety. Following the 
suppression of the Berbers in Constantine by French forces in 1871, the Algerian colonists 
retaliated for the 2,686 settlers who were killed by the rebels.  The following reparations and 57
seizures of land impoverished the Algerians of all backgrounds and resulted in widespread 
54 Samuel Kalman, ​French Colonial Fascism​ (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 10. 
55 Katz, 1195 
56 ​Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Michael J. Balz, “The October Riots in France: A Failed Immigration Policy or the 
Empire Strikes Back?” ​International Migration​ 44, no. 2 (2006): 26. 
57 Kalman, 15.  
32 
famine and poverty.  By the 1930s dissent had begun to foment in serious quantity across 58
Algeria and calls for revolution began. 
The Algerian War persisted from 1954 to 1962, and resulted in extensive casualties, with 
reports ranging from 400,000 to 1.5 million casualties  It was during the war that France became 59
exposed to another threat posed by Islam beyond the symbolic. The association of the acts of 
terrorism, designed as a form of asymmetric warfare to counter France’s greater resources and 
and military capability, introduced terroristic threat to the perceptions of Muslims.  
Towards the end of the war, the rate of bombings increased substantially. These 
bombings were carried carried out by both sides during the conflict, represented by the FLN for 
Algeria the ​Organisation de l'Armée Secrète ​OAS for France, and the attacks occurred on both 
sides of the mediterranean.  In January and February alone, France experienced 111 bombings 60
while Algeria endured a further 555 just in the month of January.  This heightened usage of 61
terrorist tactics and bombings strengthened French fears of Islamist fundamentalism in the 
decades to follow, and this impact will be discussed to a greater extent in the next chapter. 
When the war did come to an end with the Evian accords under the guidance of Charles 
de Gaulle, who had been recalled to deal with the issue of the Algerian Revolution, many felt 
betrayed that de Gaulle failed to do more to maintain the French empire. In particular, the 
pieds-noirs​ saw this act as an abandonment by the French government. 
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When the Arab revolutionaries regained power over Algeria, they demonstrated a failure 
to differentiate between the Europeans and other non-Arabs such as the 100,000 plus Jewish 
citizens of Algeria who were prevailed upon to leave the newly liberated state to much the same 
degree as the descendants of France. Where France had initially believed that the French and 
European settlers would be allowed to continue residing in Algeria following the end of the 
empire, the violent actions perpetrated by the FLN and threats of continued violence against any 
settlers who remained changed the situation. Instead of a small, steady influx of a couple 
hundred thousand settlers over several years, France experienced a swarm of nearly one million 
fleeing repatriates in the few months following liberation.   62
 
Postcolonial France 
The decolonization of French Algeria was a bloody affair, characterized primarily by 
brutal violence and acts of terror on a scale beyond that exhibited by any other former French 
colony. Both the Algerian Muslims and the European settlers in Algeria arguably had a right to 
call Algeria home, as the settlers, while ethnically foreign, had made major contributions to the 
success of Algeria through contributions to industry and healthcare among others.  This fact 63
made the results of the war more crippling for the defeated French, as the settlers felt themselves 
betrayed by both the Algerians and the French government who had failed to protect their right 
to live in their homeland. In the postcolonial period the relationship between France and Islam 
had already transformed from one of distrust to one of anger and fear. The casualties of the war 
had exacerbated negative threat perceptions and cemented Islam as a source of violence and as a 
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threat to French values. Following the war, Islamophobic sentiments pervaded the postcolonial 
atmosphere as mostly white, Catholic French males engaged in the mistreatment of Muslim 
migrants through socio-political actions and physical abuses. Finally, the influx of Muslim 
migrants in postcolonial France served to heighten the perceived threats posed by Islam through 
its increase in visibility to the French population.  How visibility leads to fear reading 64
 
Changed Perception of Muslims in Postcolonial France 
As discussed earlier, the years of colonialism had changed the French perception of 
Muslims by forcing increased levels of interactions between the two groups. Even before the 
revolution, the French had come to view Muslims as a symbolic threat to the French republican 
ideology and had refused them citizenship until 1958, only a few years before the liberation of 
Algeria.  By the end of the revolution, the acts of terrorism perpetrated by the FLN and the 65
mounting casualties experienced by the French, both at home and abroad, had exacerbated the 
already strained tensions between the two ideological groups. 
While the French had always seen Jews, Muslims, and other ​Oriental​ factions as lesser, 
the period of colonialism forced the French to recognize the unique differences and problems 
posed by the integration of Muslims into French society. Having qualified Muslims as violent, 
lazy, and hyper-religious to such a degree as to dub them incapable of assimilation into secular 
French society, the French in the post-colonial era viewed Muslim immigrants as symbolic, 
realistic, and terroristic threats to French society.  This hardening of the French attitude towards 66
Muslims paired with the psychological damage of losing their last, most integrated colony left 
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the French feeling weak and afraid. This, coupled with the historically mounting fear and distrust 
of the culturally and religiously repellant Muslims resulted in a French nation awash with 
Islamophobic views. 
It is because of the violence and fear that came to be associated with Muslims during the 
Algerian Revolution and the early postcolonial era that France’s discussions on modern threats 
of Islam have an embedded bias. “In France, the intellectual debates on the contemporary risks 
of Islamic radicalization have as a result been enriched by an older engagement with the 
Algerian situation.”  Terrorism and threats to French republican ideals became the themes 67
associated with Muslims, and this has persisted to today. This phenomenon is not confined to 
France either, as a recent study of eight European nations discovered that 50% of Europeans 
interviewed believed that Islam is an intolerant faith.  These perceptions of Islam, continue to 68
frame the debate on the risks of Islamification across Europe, and have done so for generations  
The French perception of Islam as a source of terrorism emerged from the events that 
transpired in the final days of the Revolution. “The Algerian Front de liberation nationale (FLN) 
drew much of its rhetoric and motivation from Islam, and many French soon developed a 
tremendous fear of (the) religion.”  While the French had previously come to associate Algerian 69
Muslims with laziness, aggression, and zealotry, the added threat of terrorism did not truly 
manifest in the French psyche until the extensive bombings of France and metropolitan Algeria 
were carried out by the FLN. While this form of asymmetric warfare is common during the 
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decolonization process, the religious dimension given to it by the Quranic teachings cast the 
whole of Islam as intrinsically dangerous to the French: not only symbolically, but as a source of 
terrorism as well. 
 
Treatment of Muslims in Postcolonial France 
The shift in psychological perceptions of Islam might well explain the perpetuation of 
violence against Muslim migrants in postcolonial France. During the Algerian Revolution, 
French police and citizens engaged in acts of violence and persecution against Algerian nationals 
living in France. On October 17, 1961, nearly thirty thousand Algerian nationalists were 
brutalized by the police of Paris when they came out to demonstrate in solidarity with Algeria’s 
liberation.  In the days following, estimates state that the police killed between thirty-one and 70
two hundred demonstrators for breaking the Parisian curfew and supporting Algerian liberation.  71
Furthermore, to cover up the violent acts, all police and military were granted amnesty for all 
war crimes in 1968.  While mass killings of Algerians did not continue into postcolonial France, 72
acts of violence and aggression persisted through various forms of violent politicized actions. 
One example of this perpetuated bad blood between the hereditary French and the 
Muslim migrants was the periodic violent summers which occurred throughout the 1970s and 
early 1980s. These “murderous summers” referred to the gathering of groups of French citizens, 
usually white catholic males, to assault Algerian Muslim immigrant workers.  “In sport-like 73
fashion, a group of white ​beaufs​ would set upon the ​raton​ (rat), and beat him up, destroy his 
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identity papers or payslips (thus making his stay in France illegitimate), and leave him for dead.”
 This form of Islamophobic lynching, while violent, was itself the manifestation of the police 74
brutality and murder experienced legally during the Algerian Revolution.  
After the end of these violent summers, a new more symbolic form of persecution gained 
prevalence among older white Frenchmen. The prey in these situations being young ‘immigrant’ 
children, regardless of whether they were indeed immigrants or just looked to be so. “The 
children were shot at, sniper-style, by (mostly elderly white male) neighbours from their 
apartment windows.”  This violent hazing fostered a particularly sinister symbolic meaning as 75
the shooting of children symbolized a deeper exclusion from French nationhood.  The 1980s 76
also saw the increasing use of unnecessary force carried out by French police against Muslim 
inhabitants of the ​banlieues​.  This trait of unwarranted brutality perpetrated against Muslim 77
immigrants has persisted through to today, as will be examined in chapter three. 
 
Extensive Repatriation of Settlers (Pieds-Noirs) 
For those descended from French colonizers, the revolt of the Muslim majority 
represented an attack on their legacy. For these ​pieds-noirs​, the colonization of Algeria had been 
an action of benevolence, designed to bring civilization to the barbarians and savages through the 
introduction of Christianity, infrastructure, ethics, and culture.  Even to this day, the French 78
population has difficulty regarding their period of imperial rule in negative terms, preferring to 
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focus on the benefits that they believe they brought to the Algerian people.  For them, the 79
Algerian Revolution represented a betrayal of their good works, and signified proof that Islam 
could not coexist with French republican ideals. For the ​pieds-noirs​, to be forced back to the 
mainland away from their familial homes was an affront to the legitimacy of their colonial 
mission and their inherent racial superiority.  
The primary demographic fallout from the liberation of Algeria was the subsequent 
forced repatriation of around 1 million ​pieds-noirs​ by the French government.  This large and 80
costly relocation sprouted from continued threats to the livelihoods and safety of those 
pieds-noirs​ still remaining in Algeria brought on by the rise of the previously oppressed Muslim 
majority.  After returning to mainland France, the ​pieds-noirs​ repatriates were treated with a 81
certain amount of disdain. French public opinion had begun to sour towards the actions of the 
Algerian French during the events of the Algerian Revolution and the sudden repatriation of 
these descendents of French heritage was greeted cooly by the skeptical French public. For many 
including the presiding government, the repatriated ​pieds-noirs​ represented not only a black 
mark on the history of French social republicanism, but also a threatening increase in 
competition for jobs. 
For some of the French, the ​pieds-noirs​ were demonized as the antagonists of the 
Algerian Revolution. Much in the same manner that France attempted to remove blame from 
themselves concerning their participation in the Vichy Regime, the New Left in France placed 
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the blame for all offenses of torture and abuses of Algerians on the returning ​pieds-noirs​, 
labeling them as fascists and unworthy of being French, “like all people from Algeria.”   82
The post-colonial period of the 70s and 80s was characterized by brutal. Extrajudicial 
actions taken against Algerian and Muslim immigrants on the basis of their ethnicity and 
religion. These actions perpetuated the sense of French superiority, while adding to the division 
between the two cultures. It is on this history that the FN bases its legitimacy as a defender of the 
French people from the violent and intrusive ‘other,’ the Muslims. 
 
Le Front National and Postcolonial Islamophobia 
How can it be said that the events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have provided 
fuel for populist rhetoric in the twenty-first century? Having shown that postcolonial France was 
rife with Islamophobic sentiments, how has populist rhetoric capitalized on this fear to push 
forward far-right, anti-immigrant policies in the 21st century? Populism, as previously discussed, 
rises from fears that the established government is failing to look out for the physical and 
economic security of its people. Support for populism often focuses on support for platforms of 
hyper-nationalism, anti-immigration practices, and identification of a ‘true’ national identity 
which presents voters with a designated dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them.’  It follows that a 83
population is more susceptible to the allure of populism when their identity has close ties to 
sentiments of xenophobia and self-aggrandizement or in the case of the French, ​exceptionalisme​. 
Exceptionalisme​ is the French belief that their ideals of liberte, egalite, and fraternite, as well as 
their staunch adherence to secularism, all have universal value among the French and anyone 
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trying to become French must merit it through the complete acceptance of these values. In the 
postcolonial period following the Algerian Revolution, the physical entry of ​pieds-noirs​ coupled 
with the psychological change in French perception of their place in the international community 
both contributed to the creation and rise of the FN. More importantly, the resulting cultural 
acceptance of the antagonism between republicanism and Islam continues to serve as a validation 
for the FN. 
Following the Second World War, France was a hostile environment for far-right 
political sentiment. Their efforts to expunge residual memories and guilt from the legacy of the 
Vichy regime made it nearly impossible for any extremist far-right political candidates or 
organizations to gain traction.  The turning point for this rhetoric came with the Algerian 84
Revolution; the violence and terrorism enacted by the Muslim population both in Algeria and in 
France rekindled the lights of populist sentiment in France. The 1950s saw the renewed presence 
of extreme-right organizations in politics whose primary talking point was the need to maintain 
control of French Algeria.  Beyond the political spectrum, the events of the Algerian revolution 85
prompted the creation of secret organizations such as the ​Organisation de l'Armée Secrète 
(OAS), a paramilitary group which engaged in violent acts of retribution and terrorism against 
Algerian nationals and Muslims throughout and after the war.  86
 
Demographic Change as benefit to Populist Movements 
The influx of Muslim workers was not the only mass immigration experienced by France 
in the years following Algerian liberation. The hundreds of thousands of repatriated ​pieds-noirs 
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had also arrived in France in 1962 and they too met with ostracization and social reprisals by the 
natural-born French. On returning to France, the ​pieds-noirs​ were seen not as French natives 
returning home, but as immigrants from a failed colonial period who were responsible for 
atrocities enacted against the Algerian natives. Pushed to the sidelines of society, they saw their 
return as a failure of the French government to look out for their rights and livelihoods. For 
them, it was an opportunity lost.   87
The returned settlers had been designated under the general banner of immigrant 
following their forced departure from Algeria. For them, this title ignored their cultural heritage 
and lumped them in together with the Muslims who had forced them to abandon the world they 
had settled and come to know as home. Not sure what the theory is but, individuals who find 
themselves as partially members of a nation will often engage in hyper nationalistic behavior to 
prove to others their validity as a national. For the returning colonizers, this manifested in a focus 
on French identity based on culture rather than on political definitions.  For them, there was and 88
continues to be a difference between those whose heritage is ‘true’ French, and the immigrants 
from abroad, particularly those of Arab descent.  
Unlike the Muslim immigrants, the ​pieds-noirs​ were not condemned by the Front 
National as non-French immigrants, come to change the French way of life. Instead, Jean-Marie 
Le Pen and his party embraced the returned settlers on the grounds of national identity being 
decided not by the place of one’s immediate birth or one’s processing through the legal system, 
but on one’s adherence to French cultural ideology.  
87 Choi, 128.  
88 Ibid., 129. 
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The Islamophobia experienced by the ​pied-noirs​ in their flight from their homeland in 
Algeria predisposed them to the anti-immigration rhetoric which denounced Muslims as a virus 
upon France. While other members of the French bureaucracy had generalized the returning 
settlers in the same position as all other immigrants, the FN had supported them and validated 
their French cultural identity. It is no wonder that the FN has continued to draw much of its 
support from the families of the repatriated French citizens in the decades following. As pointer 
out by Daniel Stockemer: 
“Although it is no longer the primary socialization mechanism, about 25 % of my 
interviewees were socialized by parents who embraced radical right-wing thoughts and 
ideologies. These individuals have a traditional FN background. They are descendants of 
former Algerian colonizers, come from a traditional Catholic milieu, and/or have parents 
that were active in the FN or another radical or extreme-right-wing group.”  89
 
The ​pieds-noirs​ and their descendents have consistently constituted a strong base for the far-right 
populist party since its formation. This is primarily a result of the desire of the repatriated 
citizens to be considered French once more, as opposed to being seen as ‘others’ by members of 
what they see as their own people and culture. The FN provides ​pieds-noirs​ with a political 
outlet that supports their perceptions of French ethno-cultural identity as the primary determinant 
of national identity and gives them a voice against the establishment of the government which 
cost them their familial homes in Algeria. 
 
Cultural Validity for the Extreme Right 
Perhaps the most important implications of the rise of Islamophobic sentiments in 
postcolonial France concerning the FN is the capability the FN has gained in normalizing their 
89 Stockemer, 63. 
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mantra. By virtue of being a far-right, populist party, the FN would normally continue to exist on 
the fringes of the political process, seen more as an annoying product of disgruntlement among 
the unemployed and those who believe their government fails to work for them. However, 
because France’s xenophobic sentiments are based not on fully irrational fears which occur on a 
case-by-case basis, but on a history of violence, terrorism, and repeated interactions, the threats 
of violence and Islamification which are used in the rhetoric of the FN hold broader credibility. 
The longstanding fears of Islam allow politicians like Marine Le Pen to characterize her 
comments and her calls to action not as Islamophobic, but as republican. France’s willingness to 
accept that Muslims represent numerous forms of threats to the French way of life, enables 
populist politics to become a more legitimate defense not of extreme-right policies, but of French 
republican values. 
 
Conclusion 
A nation which has experienced the power of being an imperial colonizer, and has 
proceeded to lose that power through the violent process of decolonization is more susceptible to 
the rise of populist movements because of the resulting xenophobia vis-a-vis their former 
subjects. In the case of France and her colonies, and her relationship with Algeria in particular, 
this xenophobic-backed populism is very potent due to the numerous threats seen to be posed by 
Islamic culture concerning French republican values.  
More than just xenophobia, the French populace has experienced a very real sense of 
betrayal derived from the actions of the Muslim revolutionaries during the Algerian Revolution. 
The acts of terror perpetrated by the oppressed natives of the colony planted a specific sense of 
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xenophobia in the hearts of the French people thanks to the their actions being influenced by the 
teachings of Islam. The colonization and decolonization of Algeria instilled in the French a sense 
of ‘otherness’ concerning Muslims and believers in Islam. This Islamophobia, spread through as 
sense of self-pity, cemented by the arrival of the embittered ​pieds-noirs​, and perpetuated by the 
denial of French-directed atrocities against their former colonial subjects, has changed the 
French psyche. This change will be examined further in future chapters concerning the passing 
of legislation banning physical representations of Islam in public.  
France’s colonial history and her continued belief in the importance of her republican 
values and secular identity have predisposed her to being the perfect target for xenophobic 
populist rhetoric. The following rise of the Front National as a prominent and established party in 
the years following the liberation of Algeria, while certainly due to a multitude of factors, is a 
demonstration of the impact that Islamophobia has on the political system in France. The 
Algerian Revolution reintroduced far-right sentiments into French politics, and the violent 
interactions and terrorism of the period established a firm perceived threat posed by Muslims and 
their faith to French. The FN gained significant ground in the following years by capitalizing off 
of the Islamophobic sentiments left over from colonial times. More importantly, the FN has 
consistently utilized France’s commitments to secularism and universalism as validation for 
anti-Muslim rhetoric by claiming that they are acting for the betterment of all French. However, 
their definition of ‘all French’ remains exclusive and ethnocentric. Going forward, this paper will 
demonstrate how, while other events and circumstances have exacerbated the sentiments of 
Islamophobia and resulted in increased support for the FN, the sentiments themselves have long 
been a part of French identity. 
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The Exacerbation of French Islamophobia: Terrorism in France 
Forward 
The acts of terrorism which have plagued France in the twenty-first century provide significant 
evidence for the link between rising Islamophobic sentiments and increased support for 
populism. Terrorism promotes populism in France for four reasons. First, terrorism incites 
emotional reactions of fear and anger. In doing so, terrorism increases political participation, 
particularly among individuals who previously were inactive in the political sphere. Second, 
constituents and politicians gravitate towards right-wing authoritarian policies post-terror, 
sacrificing civil liberties for more authoritarian security.  Third, France’s pre-existing fears of 90
Islam and the supposed incompatibility between French cultural identity and the cultural 
teachings of Islam contextualizes terrorism in cultural-political dimensions. Fourth, the political 
reactions to acts of terrorism serve to further legitimize the Front National platform by targeting 
Muslims as a single group. These four functions of terrorism support the rising power and 
influence of the FN in France. 
 
Introduction 
On January 7, 2015, two men arrived at the Paris office building of Charlie Hebdo, a 
satirical magazine outlet known for distributing derogatory comics and images debasing the 
religion of Islam and the prophet Muhammed. There, Said Kouachi and his brother Cherif 
Kouachi entered the establishment with Kalashnikov rifles and murdered 12 people. The next 
90 ​Bethany Albertson and Shana Kushner Gadarian, ​Anxious Politics: Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening 
World​ (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 13. 
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day a policewoman is killed. The day after that, a man named Amedy Coulibaly took several 
hostages in a Jewish supermarket, killing four of them. All four perpetrators are killed in 
shootouts with French police. All four of the attackers were associated with al-Qaeda, and their 
actions were lauded by the Islamic state known as ISIS.  After leaving the ruined offices of 91
Charlie Hebdo, the Kouachi brothers were captured on an amateur recording, saying that they 
had avenged the Prophet Muhammed.   92
It was the first instance of coordinated terrorism on French soil in twenty years, and it 
would begin a new period of terror in France. Later that same year, France experienced a loss of 
life “not witnessed since the end of the Second World War,” when the November Paris Attacks 
resulted in 130 deaths and over 400 injuries.  Two years later, Presidential candidate Marine Le 93
Pen succeeded in garnering one-third of the vote as a fringe-party, right-wing extremist 
candidate. What is the connection between the advent of terrorism and the rise of populist 
support? Has the increase in acts of terror by Muslim Fundamentalists caused the increased 
support for populist leaders and changed people’s hearts? Or were the conditions and sentiments 
already there and the attacks only exacerbated them? This chapter will seek to answer these 
questions through a targeted analysis of the major terror attacks of the 21st century using existing 
theory on the impact of fear, anxiety, and anger on the people’s ideologies and actions, and the 
political results following acts of terror. 
This chapter will begin by defining terrorism through its causes and justifications, before 
reviewing existing literature on the psychological and political fallout of terrorism. Next follows 
91 Lawrence Davidson, “Who Is Charlie?” ​Middle East Policy​ 23, no. 1, (2016): 170. 
92 Eva Polonska-Kimunguyi and Marie Gillespie, “Terrorism discourse on French international broadcasting: France 
24 and the case of Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris,” ​European Journal of Communication​ 3, no. 5 (2016): 574. 
93 Gino G. Raymond, “After Charlie : The Unravelling of the French Republican Response,” ​Patterns of Prejudice 
52, no. 1 (2018): 26. 
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an overview of the three major acts of terrorism faced by France during the 21st century, namely 
the Charlie Hebdo shootings, the November Paris Attacks, and the Bastille Day truck massacre 
in Nice. This section will review the events of the attacks, their context, and the immediate 
public reactions. It shall evaluate how the impacts of terrorism extended beyond physical damage 
to determine how terrorism has impacted France socially and politically. Shifts towards 
right-wing “authoritarian policies at the expense of civil liberties,” loss of faith in established 
regimes, “support of high-risk aggressive political actions,” and lowering of tolerance for 
perceived “out-groups and ideological rivals,” are some examples of this fallout.  Additionally, 94
these case studies will examine the actions taken by the media and the government in framing the 
attacks and the significance of their actions. Finally, this chapter shall conclude by looking at 
how this surge in terrorism has been used by the Front National to spread their influence and 
give their movement legitimacy. 
 
What is Terrorism? 
From the shootings at the Charlie Hebdo magazine to the November attacks to the 
tragedy in Nice, all of these attacks fell within the definition of terrorism. One proposed 
argument is that terrorism is a “manifestation of political violence that is distinct from other 
types of violence, such as organized crime, mass civil conflict, riots or uprisings.”  The primary 95
purpose of such premeditated attacks is the creation of a “climate of extreme fear” through which 
a terrorist can address a wider audience with their political and/or ideological statements.  It is 96
94 Pavlos Vasilopoulos, “Terrorist Events, Emotional Reactions, and Political Participation: The 2015 Paris Attacks,” 
West European Politics​ 41, no. 1, 2018, 102. 
95 ​Polonska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie, 571-72. 
96 Ibid., 572. 
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through the spread of these targeted messages and the spread of terror that a single individual or 
group can garner an entire nation’s attention.  
The act of terrorism is a heavily politicized one, designed to shock the public and bring 
about change through violent acts. Sylvain Brouard presents a French interpretation of terrorism 
in his article on the political responses to the 2015 and 2016 terror attacks in France. He defines 
terrorism as “a systematic campaign of indiscriminate violence against public civilian targets to 
influence a wider audience.”  Terrorists commit acts of violence to spread fear and political 97
unrest throughout a nation. In some cases, terrorism is born from a domestic impetus, where 
disgruntled citizens resort to violence for reasons of securing political change in their own 
government. However, in the French case, while the perpetrators have originated in France as 
citizens, the overarching discourse on contemporary terrorism depicts the attacks not as domestic 
disgruntlement, but as an imported hatred and extremism from Islamism abroad. This presents 
another issue, as it overlooks the failure of the French government to effectively integrate 
Muslim immigrants into French society, placing the blame firmly on Islamist fundamentalism, 
but this topic will be addressed in full later on in this paper. 
These violent demonstrations can physically manifest in many diverse ways including the 
taking of hostages, the blowing-up of an important building or landmark, or the indiscriminate 
shooting of an unarmed population. What matters when defining and understanding terrorism is 
that the perpetrators have a political objective for which they are not only willing but eager to 
target civilians with deadly force. The results of this are at best, the elimination of the aggressors 
by law-enforcement, and at worst, the deaths of any number of people and possibly the 
97 Sylvain Brouard, Pavlos Vasilopoulos, and Martial Foucault, “How terrorism affects political attitudes: France in 
the aftermath of the 2015-2016 attacks,” ​West European Politics​ 41, no. 5, 2018, 1074. 
49 
destruction of commercial, political, or cultural edifices. While the initial strike of terrorism is 
often what is focused on in the media and later on in history books, it is the fallout of the attack 
which is most important to the analysis of terror’s political impacts. 
 
Emotional Reactions to Terrorism and their Political Implications 
Existing literature on terrorism has determined that there are several common emotional 
reactions which follow a successful act of terror on a mass scale. These emotions and their 
impacts on following actions can change in severity depending on the violence and shock of the 
situation as well as on the previously existing conditions. Most importantly, the way in which 
media portrays an act of terror plays a significant role in the reactions of those affected by the 
fear of terrorism. Acts of terror create widespread sentiments of fear and anger in the targeted 
population. These psychological reactions to terror impact not only the amount of time and effort 
spent participating in political functions, but also the views one has concerning party affiliation 
values, particularly security. Individuals who feel threatened by acts of terror have historically 
demonstrated shifts in political views, tending to lean further to the right on policy issues of 
security.  And all of these reactions are heightened by the work of the news media following an 98
attack as media outlets are wont to reinforce personal political agendas with biased wording, 
visuals, and reporting.  
According to Pavlos Vasilopoulos, an associate researcher at the Centre de Researches 
Politiques, there are two primary psychological reactions following acts of terrorism; fear and 
anger.  In both cases, the subject experiencing said emotion is faced with a situation that is alien 99
98 ​Brouard, Vasilopoulos, and Foucault, 1076. 
99 Vasilopoulos, 103. 
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to them; one that disrupts their “desired condition.”  Additionally, the spread of either of these 100
emotional states coupled with “exposure to violence tends to increase political participation.”  101
However, fear and anger manifest in significantly different ways on the political spectrum as will 
be demonstrated later using empirical data collected before and after the Charlie Hebdo 
Shootings and the November ‘15 Paris attacks. 
 
Fear: Increased Seeking for Threatening Information 
The initial reaction following acts of terror is often one of increased anxiety and fear. 
Anxiety arises in situations where the public is subjected to a situation they perceive as 
threatening, specifically in a matter that they feel is out of their control.  Following a violent 102
event lying outside of ordinary conditions, witnesses to violence experience fear that their 
security is not being upheld. This fear often translates into a breakdown of trust for their 
government, upon whom the public relies to provide for their safety.  This breakdown of trust 103
only occurs for a government who is seen as incapable of addressing the source of the anxiety. A 
capable government that presented itself as capable of handling the situation would instead 
receive an increase in public trust.  104
Existing literature shows that “fear enhances the political information-seeking process,” 
particularly among individuals who previously have refrained from engaging in any significant 
political participation.  Fear itself is the feeling of helplessness in the face of threatening 105
100 Ibid, 105. 
101 Ibid, 103. 
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conditions, making it natural for humans to seek out additional information to better prepare 
themselves to cope with the threatening situations.  Unfortunately, the types of information 106
pursued by individuals driven by extraordinary anxiety are often of a biased nature which can 
negatively impact the knowledge obtained.  “Individuals… will concentrate on threatening 107
information because this information may seem more relevant to avoiding future harms and thus 
potentially reducing anxiety than positive information.”  In the days following acts of terror, 108
this inclination to seek out threatening information can prove damaging to the processing of facts 
as terrorism transforms from an unframed disaster to a politicized phenomenon. Particularly as 
the media has demonstrated itself to be inherently biased against Muslims in the reporting on 
terrorism.  109
Affective Intelligence theory states that citizens alternate between two types of political 
decision-making strategies depending on their external environment. In times of peace and 
stability, people rely on habit, following practices that maximize their usage of time. However, 
when placed in dangerous or threatening situations, individuals transform into attentive voters 
because their anxiety enhances political interest and the desire to learn more.  One byproduct of 110
this newfound desire to be informed is the increased capacity to reject established ideologies in 
favor of “contemporary assessments of their political environment.   111
One issue with the increased following of news on tv following acts of terrorism is that, 
while more information is collected and political involvement increases, those individuals who 
106 ​Albertson and Gadarian, 10. 
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previously lacked political sophistication have trouble discerning between objective reporting 
and media with an agenda. The media consumed following the terrorist attacks in 2015 tended to 
export certain unfounded biases and generalizations Despite the fact that the majority of the 
terrorist attacks experienced by France have been committed by French citizens, France 24, the 
French international broadcaster, portrayed the shootings on January 7th as “an external 
phenomenon coming to France from outside,” and as such bought into the larger discourse on 
terrorism in the western world.   112
 
Anger: Increased Willingness to Participate in Political Functions  
Following the onset of fear, public opinion becomes influenced to a greater degree by the 
influx of news media concerning the event. The media, in turn, delivers a target at which the 
public can direct their emotions and begin to reacquire the sense of control. By introducing a 
subject for the public to view as the reason for the change in desired conditions, the news media 
changes the psychological stimulus presented to the public and introduces anger as a second 
widespread psychological disposition. While fear spreads in reaction to unfamiliar situations that 
are uncontrollable to the individual, anger “arises when “one’s existing desired condition is 
disrupted, often by intentional actions of an identified other, and when the individual feels 
confident in their resources to attack the blame target.”  It is the existence of this identified 113
‘other’ which allows feelings of concern and fear to be channeled and redirected into action. It is 
through anger that a terrorized populace discovers the drive to strike back against the supposed 
perpetrators of the central harmful event. 
112 Polonska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie, 568. 
113 Vasilopoulos, 105. 
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Where the fearful act under the perception that they cannot control their altered 
conditions, the allure of anger lies in that it provides the individual “a sense of control over the 
threatening stimulus.”  Following the Charlie Hebdo shootings, 67% of survey French citizens 114
reported feelings of anger in response to the disruption of their peaceful society.  It is therefore 115
understandable that the public response, where 6% of the French population took to the streets to 
demonstrate, achieved its unheard of rates of participation.  Anger is enticing when compared 116
to fear as it represents the retaking of control from external forces. Having someone to blame for 
the negative changes in one’s environment, whether the changes come in the form of 
unemployment or a nearby shooting, is a choice many will make to escape the the lack of control 
felt while suffering under fear. 
 
Shifts in Political Views 
Following the immediate psychological changes spread by acts of terror, there is often a 
shift in political ideological positions towards a more authoritarian right-wing policies 
concerning matters of security. Feelings of anxiety often push individuals to search out authority 
figures on the matter in question. Oftentimes, one political party or partisan wing controls a 
certain policy more than the other. Traditionally speaking, issues of terrorism, security, and 
immigration have been framed as major issues and focuses of far-right political parties.   117
When seeking to improve safety after increased awareness of risk, individuals are often 
willing to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for authoritarian security measures. This is 
114 Ibid, 105. 
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particularly true if the civil liberty restrictions target a specific perceived out-group in the 
community which has been framed as a scapegoat.  This comes from the desire of individuals 118
to gain control over their situation through improved understanding of the issue. However, the 
willingness to accept elite and media opinions as fact can allow for framing of an accident 
beyond is actual parameters. This leads to the manipulation of the public for personal interest.  119
Had the terrorist attacks in France not been framed as direct results of Islam, the events likely 
would have been seen as the actions of a few disgruntled individuals, rather than as a symptom 
of Islam and Muslim presence in France.  
Having examined the existing literature on the impacts of terrorism on popular emotions, 
political participation, and policy preferences, it is now time to return the case of terrorism in 
France. The following case analyses will examine the major terror events of 2015 and 2016 and 
demonstrate how their existence catalyzed support for the FN’s populist, anti-immigrant rhetoric, 
and how terrorism made French politicians more likely to adopt far-right policies pertaining to 
security due to perceived popular demand. 
 
Case Studies of the Reactions to Terrorism 
When discussing modern terrorism in France there are three events which warrant 
evaluation and analysis. The Charlie Hebdo Shootings, the November Paris Attacks, and the 
Truck Massacre in Nice are uniquely memorable for their violence, shock, and sheer magnitude. 
They also support existing theory as 46% of French citizens polled expressed feeling fear 
following the Charlie Hebdo shootings.  Following the November attacks, similar results were 120
118 Ibid., 13. 
119 Ibid., 14. 
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reported in the form of heightened levels of fear and anger.  Understanding the responses to 121
these events and the trends following them is crucial to understanding how the Front National 
capitalized off of terror-induced Islamophobia. 
 
Charlie Hebdo Shootings (January 7-9, 2015) 
As addressed at the beginning of the chapter, the Charlie Hebdo shootings and 
subsequent killings on January 8 and 9 left 17 French citizens dead before French police 
managed to hunt down and kill the perpetrators. The Kouachi brothers and Amedy Coulibaly had 
previously planned this attack out in large part as an act of revenge for the offensive anti-Muslim 
material that Charlie Hebdo was known for.  The shootings at the Charlie Hebdo office marked 122
the first act of coordinated terrorism on French soil in twenty years. This event shocked France 
out of its relative complacency as the most secure western democracy and reopened political 
discourse on the presumed security of the nation.  The attack along with the subsequent police 
and hostage killings over the next two days shook the nation and aggravated tensions between 
the large Muslim minority and the non-Muslim French population.  
Following this initial act of terror, “between 3 and 4 million demonstrators, about 6 
percent of the French population” took to the streets on January 11th holding signs with what has 
become the iconic message “Je Suis Charlie,” I am Charlie.  The demonstration was the largest 123
in France’s history and portrayed an image of a united republic to the world. The political 
response to the Charlie Hebdo shootings was one of support for the demonstrations, engaging in 
a rallying behind the ‘Je Suis Charlie’ banner and declaring the attack an assault on all that 
121 Ibid, 115. 
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France holds dearest: their ​liberte, egaliter, and fraternite​.  Emmanuel Todd, a professor, 124
historian, and sociologist at the National Institute of Demographic Studies in Paris came forth 
after the demonstrations suggesting that the government was responsible for creating an 
environment “where everyone who was a true French citizen had to identify with the January 7 
victims, as well as the alleged ‘free speech’ behavior that drew their attackers to them.”  This 125
message of uniformity and republican values forced upon the Muslim population living in France 
a terrible choice between supporting their faith and their various national and ethnic identities or 
agreeing with the validity of the free speech advocated for by Charlie Hebdo. 
The Muslim extremists responsible for this shooting were quickly reported to be 
associated with al-Qaeda and ISIS.  Because of these affiliations and the widely televised 126
footage of the killers claiming the attack for the glory of the Prophet Muhammed, French media 
portrayal of the terrorist event exhibited the same biases shown by the United States after 
September 11. Rather than focusing on the specific reasons motivating the individuals who had 
perpetrated the acts, French media like their international broadcasting network, France 24 
generalized the source of the violence. France 24 was quick to report to the public that the attack 
had been made by defenders of Islam.  In addition, the media introduced further uncertainty 127
and fear by noting the links between the terrorists and the ​banlieues​ of Paris which had long 
since been a sanctuary for the segregated Muslim poor.   128
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Charlie Hebdo had until the attack been known for its crude and defiling cartoons 
mocking French minorities, particularly Muslims and Jews.  The cartoons focused greatly on 129
the prophet Muhammed; placing him in unorthodox and crude situations designed to mock the 
Islamic faith and undermine their religious messiah. The magazine had previously received 
multiple lawsuits back in 2012 from Islamic organizations asking for the removal of offensive 
and derogatory depictions of their faith and had been under police-protection following a series 
of threats made the year before the attack.  130
While a violent response is obviously to be condemned, the reality remains that the 
Charlie Hebdo shootings were in response to a direct insult to the perpetrators’ faith and cultural 
heritage. Perhaps this is why, when so many were taking to the streets in support of Charlie, 
Muslim students in the public education system began speaking out that they did not support this 
particular show of solidarity.  The failure of Muslim students in the French public education 131
system to observe the minute of silence on behalf of the victims of the shootings became a major 
issue in the political discourse at the time.  This failure to support the victims, as it was framed 132
by the media, was seen as a rejection of the French republican values of freedom of speech, 
rather than a refusal to support Islamophobic proponents. 
Following the initial demonstrations, the socialist government under Francois Hollande 
increased their funding and support for national security.  Despite the fact that Hollande was a 133
socialist president whose personal beliefs stemmed mostly from his commitment to liberalism, in 
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the events following Charlie Hebdo, he disparaged the Muslim community as a threat to 
republican values.  This shift towards right-wing politics and anti-Muslim rhetoric would 134
become a feature of the later years of Hollande’s presidency through his handling of future terror 
events. 
The revival of terrorism in France also incurred violent retaliation from the French 
public. “Whereas 2014 saw 133 reported (anti-Muslim) hate crimes, there were more than 400 
such bias incidents in 2015. Per the French National Human Rights Commission (CNCDH), this 
represented a 223 percent increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes.”  Just as anger can incentivize 135
individuals to increase their visible participation in political functions, it is likely the increased 
feelings of anger led to increased rates of violence. This increase in aggression towards Muslims 
throughout France also signalled to politicians the rising tide of fear and the possibilities of 
co-opting this fear of Islamic terrorism for political power. More generally, the return of 
terrorism revived the perceived terroristic threats that had been attributed to Islam since the 
Algerian Revolution.  
 
The November Paris Attacks (November 13, 2015) 
While the shootings of Charlie Hebdo left a lasting scar on the people of France, that 
same year gave witness to the greatest death toll from terrorism than during any individual 
month in their history. ​ The November Paris attacks were a series of coordinated acts of 136
brutality that took place on November 13, 2015, resulting in 130 deaths and over 400 additional 
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injuries, of which 100 were reported to be serious in nature.  These attacks were the deadliest 137
experienced by France since the Second World War and opened the door for valid criticism of 
the administration’s inability to provide for the security of the French people. 
Where the Charlie Hebdo shootings had been in response to a clear and repeated 
provocation, mocking the foundations of the Islamic faith, the November attacks were different. 
No specified ideological reasoning came to light following the attack, no insult issued against the 
prophet Muhammed, nor any shared hatred of Islam between the victims. What little analysis 
does exist on the reasoning behind the attack on November 13th, 2015 seems to agree that these 
attacks, perpetrated by fundamentalists with ties to Daesh, were initiated with the purpose of 
spreading fear and uncertainty across all of France.   138
Despite the November Paris attacks resulting in a significantly higher loss of life, the 
impact on the French populace could be said to be comparable to the reactions to the Charlie 
Hebdo shootings. It is likely that the relatively muted outrage was a result of the atack being less 
shocking in the wake of the January attacks. This is not to say that Charlie Hebdo had inoculated 
the French population against the emotional distress derived from acts of terrorism.  
 One of the most significant developments to come from the November attacks was the 
response to the call for increased security given by President Francois Hollande. Three days after 
the attack, Hollande met with the Houses of Parliament to suggest the initiation of a State of 
Emergency. “(This) expanded executive and police powers with minimal judicial oversight.”  139
The results of these unsupervised increases to police power and decreases to civil liberties has 
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resulted in a substantial increase in reported acts of anti-Islamic discrimination.  Hollande also 140
proposed changes that would permit the government to deprive naturalized individuals of their 
citizenship if they became suspected of aiding or abetting acts of terrorism.   141
 
The Car Massacre in Nice (July 14, 2016) 
While other acts of terror have been committed in France since the November Paris 
attacks, there is only one other instance in which terrorism truly shook the nation and recalled 
into question the ability of the government to protect its citizens. On Bastille Day, July 14, 2016, 
Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a Tunisian resident of France drove a cargo truck into a crowd 
celebrating on the streets of Nice killing 86 people and injuring over 400 more.  This act of 142
terror happened months after the November Paris attacks and was taken by many as a sign that 
the State of Emergency issued by President Francois Hollande that same month had failed to 
effectively deter terrorism.  
Unfortunately, the Nice attack has not received nearly as much coverage and analysis in 
terms of the media’s portrayal of the events as the 2015 attacks received. However, the attack 
quickly became framed as a direct attack on France’s universal values of equality, being that it 
was perpetuated on Bastille Day, a celebration of French republicanism.  143
The Nice attack could be considered as the third strike of Hollande’s government. When 
Charlie Hebdo occurred, the general consensus was that it was an awful event which warranted 
140 Jim Wolfreys, 22. 
141 Olivier Duhamel, “Terrorism and Constitutional Amendment in France,” ​European Constitutional Law Review 
12, no. 1 (2016): 1. 
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an increase in focus on security. With November, critics of the government, especially members 
of the FN opened up harsh criticism against the government for failing to make the necessary 
changes to their security policy to prevent tragedy from occurring a second time. Nice presented 
for many individuals a final straw effect. Notably, many regional governments, regardless of 
political affiliation, took it upon themselves to enact local security measures against what they 
proposed was a threat to French national security. More specifically in the months following the 
2016 attack, regional governments from Marseilles to Pas-de-Calais passed legislation banning 
the wearing of burkinis on public beaches.  144
The burkini bans which spread across France in the aftermath of the massacre were 
proposed as a mitigating factor concerning Islamist extremism on the beach. Including the ​hijab​, 
jilbab​, ​burqa​, and ​niqab​, the ​burkini​ brings the total number of Muslim female garments 
outlawed to some degree by France and her regions.  In practice, the bans saw the advent of 145
French police going from beach to beach forcing Muslim women to remove their swimwear or 
pay a fine for disobeying a law specifically targeting their religious expression in a country built 
on ideals of tolerance.  146
 
Framing Reactions to Terrorism in terms of existing Islamophobic Tensions 
While the Muslim population was targeted to a greater extent following the acts of terror 
and distrust did grow between practitioners of Islam and most others in France, this cultural 
divide is not strictly a product of modern terrorism. France’s difficulties with Islam are not 
144 Wolfreys, 85. 
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contemporary developments. Going back before the terrorist actions of the Algerian National 
Liberation Front during their attempted revolution, France had already nurtured an ingrained fear 
and uncertainty for the Muslim population brought to their shores through work or asylum. 
France has also been home to one of the greatest populations of Muslims in Europe thanks to 
their colonial links to Africa.  This has proven uniquely difficult for the French, as their staunch 147
belief in secularity naturally conflicts with the Muslim population adherence to Islam. This 
conflict, both political and religious in nature depending on the event has bubbled over into 
outright violence on several occasions over the 20th century including the bombing of a train in 
Paris back in 1995 by Algerian terrorist who openly expressed having drawn inspiration from the 
teachings of Islam. 
Perhaps the most significant pre-existing condition in France concerning the treatment 
and framing of the 2015 terror attacks was the historical deep-seated distrust and animosity that 
many French citizens held for the ostracized and separated Islamic population in the ​banlieues 
surrounding all major French cities. The divide between the French cultural values and those of 
Islam has manifested itself in political avenues as well with the passage of the “law of 2004 on 
‘conspicuous signs of religious identity,’ which forbade girls from wearing the Islamic headscarf 
in public educational institutions.”  It was this ban which truly brought the Islamophobia in 148
France forth as a global issue. Legal practices continued to target Islamic citizens and migrants 
through means such as the refusal of naturalization, the prohibition of garments deemed unfit for 
French society, and the targeting of Muslim populations as a scapegoat for economic issues, 
147 Natalie J. Doyle, “Lessons from France: Popularist anxiety and veiled fears of Islam,” ​Islam & Christian-Muslim 
Relations ​ 22, no. 4 (2011): 476. 
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perpetrated in large part by Le Front National.  Long before Charlie Hebdo, the French Judicial 149
System was already biased against those they perceived as opponents to the French way of life, 
namely the Islamic Muslim minority.  
In a related issue, the significant Muslim population in France has for the most part been 
segregated from other French citizens geographically with the creation and perpetuation of the 
banlieues​ surrounding most of her major cities. These “badlands of the Republic” as they were 
referred to by the French media following the terrorist attacks in 2015, had been established 
around Paris as a fallout from the influx of Muslim workers brought in from Northern Africa to 
help rebuild France following WWII.  Since then these areas, originally designed as temporary 150
residences for the workers in the mid 20th century have devolved into Muslim-heavy slums 
known for their poor living conditions and heightened rates of violence and poverty.  151
One final issue to consider before returning to the concept of terrorism is that, before 
Charlie Hebdo was attacked, France had not experienced an act of coordinated terrorism of such 
violence and magnitude since 1995, 20 years earlier, when an Algerian terrorist syndicate 
bombed a train under Paris. While this is less significant in understanding why Muslims were 
targeted going forward, it is important from a psychological standpoint. Individuals who find 
their previously assumed notions about reality to be false tend to react with anxiety and anger. 
 
Analysis of France’s Reactions to Terror 
Long before the Charlie Hebdo shootings, former French Prime Minister Manuel Valls 
had put forth the reality that “social segregation was… undeniably visible in certain parts of 
149 Ibid., 477. 
150 Moran, 316 & 321. 
151 Ibid., 321. 
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France.”  The introduction of fear and anger into France’s political climate has been seen to 152
shift previous political leanings towards the right from pre-terror positions. Voters who in times 
of peace and security felt safe in supporting politicians based on their economic and social 
outlooks, or even on their party loyalties. However, once the security of peace is disturbed by 
acts of violence lying outside their preexisting desired conditions, individuals alter their priorities 
away from economic and social prosperity and exhibit a tendency to support increasingly 
militaristic and authoritarian policies.  153
Political leaders are no exception to this trend of drifting towards the “illiberal right” as 
demonstrated by France’s former president, Francois Hollande, following the November of 2015 
Paris attacks.  Hollande instituted a state of emergency in France in order to conduct searches 154
of property without warrants. Even as a socialist president, he enacted policies in response to the 
acts of terror that would in other circumstances be “evocative of far-right politics” because it was 
those policies that a fearful public begged for to ease their minds.  155
France is certainly not the only nation to have been affected on a national scale by the 
advent of modern terrorism. Following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, the United 
States was shaken to its core as millions tuned in to the political affairs of their nation believing 
that their security was in danger and their government was incapable of providing answers. It is 
the response of then-President George W. Bush that illustrates one significant generalization that 
continues to this day to be an issue for the proper treatment of the threat of terrorism.  
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Rather than identifying the responsible party and providing proper distinctions between 
militant Islamism and Islam as a faith and Muslims and Islam generally, Bush initiated the War 
on Terror, which unintentionally framed all of Islam as a monolithic, radical threat of terrorism 
to the democratic West.  This generalization of Islam has spread throughout Europe to 156
permeate the political and media worlds. However, it is noteworthy that France’s previous 
experiences with terrorism during the Algerian War of Independence had also been linked to 
Islam, seeing as much of the rhetoric used by the FLN was inspired by the sentiments of Islam.  157
 
Capitalizing on the Outcomes of Terrorism: Front National 
Having explained the physical, psychological, and political effects of terrorism on a 
national populace, it remains to show how the FN has capitalized on these exacerbating factors. 
To recount the major findings of this chapter the first major point is that terrorism results in 
heightened levels of fear and anger. These psychological states, in turn, result in increased 
seeking-out of political information by means of media consumption in the case of fear, and in 
an increased desire to participate in the political process in the case of anger. Additionally, it has 
been recorded that political novices are impacted by the onset of fear and anger following acts of 
terrorism to a greater degree.  This is a logical finding, as previously politically involved 158
members of the public would not experience as significant a change in their participation due to 
their already extensive levels of involvement. It is now necessary to return to the existence of 
populism as an entity, its platform, and its allure to the fearful and disgruntled. 
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For the FN, it is not a difficult task to capitalize on fears of Islamic fundamentalism as 
their own programme in 2012 had denounced the religion as “an inherently dangerous religion 
that does not respect the separation between state and church.”  This belief system which 159
originated with Jean-Marie Le Pen, has been perpetuated under the tenure of his daughter, 
Marine Le Pen, and has placed the FN in a perfect position to benefit off of the increase in 
Islamophobic sentiments. Not only does the current discourse on terrorism demonstrate that 
terrorism is followed by increased support for authoritarian, far-right policies concerning 
security, the previous efforts of the FN leadership to define their party as an expert on issues of 
security has led to increased focus on the advice and rhetoric of the FN.  
First one must examine the evidence of change in support for the FN in France following 
the terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016. In December of 2015, William Horobin, a journalist for 
the Wall Street Journal wrote an article stressing the gains in regional election representation that 
the FN was bound to make following the November Paris Attacks due to Marine Le Pen’s 
framing of the situation; with her calls for tighter security ignored by the existing socialist 
government and the resulting deaths a product of that incompetence.  By placing herself at the 160
forefront of France’s debate on security, Marine Le Pen successfully cast Hollande and his 
government as ill-prepared and incapable of protecting the public. Beyond Le Pen’s personal 
image, the acts of terrorism in France resulted in the passing of several major laws which could 
be described as extreme-right and authoritarian. The most important policy being the initiation of 
the State of Emergency, which in coming from a socialist government, represented a vote of 
159 Daniel Stockemer, ​The Front National in France : Continuity and Change Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine 
Le Pen​ (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 34. 
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support for the FN’s authoritarian security preferences without the FN leadership needing to take 
responsibility for any negative repercussions. 
 
Conclusion 
Terrorism is a global phenomenon even if the majority of its coverage comes from the 
handful of Western European states and the U.S, and the immediate short-term effects are always 
similar. Fear spreads outwards as individuals recognize their peace to be shattered and that fear 
often leads individuals to increase their value for information in their efforts to regain control 
over the new threat. It is after this initial preconscious reaction that individuals begin to form 
new opinions and strategies based off of those opinions. During this time, the framing of 
terrorism is crafted by the media and politicians as they attempt to harness the increased levels of 
political involvement and the increased willingness of the public to place in leaders viewed as 
capable of addressing the threat. This relationship explains why socialist president, Francois 
Hollande, failed to maintain a tolerant and accepting approach towards French Muslims in the 
aftermath of the 2015 terror attacks and instead chose to initiate a State of Emergency. This 
action provided for increased occurrences of police brutality and discriminatory actions against 
Muslim citizens and further legitimized the platform of the FN. 
While the events of 2015 and 2016 clearly demonstrate a valid source for Islamophobic 
sentiment in their connections to Islam and, in the case of Charlie Hebdo, their primary 
motivations, the framing of these terrorist events points clearly to the underlying sentiments of 
Islamophobia left over from France’s history. The portrayal of the events by the media initially 
focused on the events as they occurred, their quick transition to a more politicized and thematic 
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approach to understanding the motivations for the terror events demonstrates this very bias 
inherent in the French identity.   161
The acts of terrorism in 2015 and 2016 shook the French world. Not since the 2nd world 
war had lives been lost in the numbers brought on by the November attacks, and the responses to 
these attacks have been various and flavored with the history of the French people. As with most 
nations who have experienced the horrors of an act of terrorism the people of France exhibited 
widespread reactions of fear and anger following the 2015 attacks. In the immediate aftermath of 
both of these events, there was a demonstrably higher consumption of tv news media by French 
citizens seeking to gain information about the new situation.  These events were also followed 162
by noticeable increases in political participation by means of voting numbers and willingness to 
demonstrate in rallies.  
This chapter has sought out to prove is that the revival of terrorist activity in France after 
twenty years has succeeded in reawakening French Islamophobic sentiment. The resulting 
sentiments of fear and anger, framed by the national media, have resulted in political shifts in 
preferences concerning security values, as well as changes in the trust levels for the existing 
governments. This uncertainty is what Marine Le Pen played upon following the November Paris 
attacks and it resulted in several regional successes for the FN in December of 2015. All in all, 
this chapter’s goal is to demonstrate how Islamophobia was reinvigorated by these terrorist 
events, and how the resulting treatment of these events by the media, the government, and the 
FN have further exacerbated tensions between the Muslim minority in France, and those most 
likely to increase their participation in French politics following acts of terror. 
161 Polonska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie, 573. 
162 Vasilopoulos, 110. 
69 
Terrorism reminds the public that the government is in charge of safeguarding their 
safety and security against all domestic and foreign threats. “Governments are expected to 
maintain public order and, in time of crisis, to (re)create order. They do so through the 
manipulation of images, symbols, and rituals.”  Regarding the reactions of Hollande’s 163
government, the events of 2015 and 2016 did call into question his ability to provide for the 
security of his people. This threat to popular support incentivized the socialist government to 
enact policies which would otherwise be seen as extreme-right, authoritarian policies in the face 
of growing public unrest. 
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A Clash of Cultures: Islamophobia and the European Refugee Crisis 
 
Introduction 
The FN supports several major policies, but their primary focus is on the immigration 
issue faced by France, specifically concerning the immigration of Muslims. In 2015, the nation 
of Syria experienced a mass exodus as its people attempted to escape the violence and bloodshed 
which have come to ravage the country in the internationally-backed battle between the Assad 
regime and the various rebel forces. These migrants have spread over the globe in a great 
diaspora and many have made their way to the borders of the European Union, in which they 
now seek and claim asylum from the violence in their homeland. As of this point in time, nearly 
four million refugees and migrants have applied for asylum in the EU.  Among its colleagues, 164
France has accepted some of the largest numbers of refugees in the past four years. This influx 
has added to the already substantial Muslim immigrant population present in France and has 
provided increased ammunition for anti-immigrant parties playing on the public's fear for 
personal safety and job security. Because of pre-existing perceived threats attributed to Islam and 
Muslims by the French population, the increase in immigrant population and visibility has stoked 
feelings of anxiety among the French population.  In turn, the government has repeatedly 165
responded to these growing fears and tensions by instituting increasingly authoritarian security 
measures which asymmetrically target Muslims and their faith. 
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France’s trouble with accepting Muslim immigrants is not a new development. As 
discussed in chapter one, the French government has often mistreated Muslim immigrants based 
on fears of their cultural influence and more realistic threats of violence and job security posed 
by the integration of a large migrant population. The tensions derived from France’s previous 
interactions with Algerian terrorism and Muslim religiosity remain present in discussions of the 
impact of the arriving refugees, and several prominent figures in French politics have spoken 
against the acceptance of further refugees, whose arrival coincides with the renewed occurences 
of terrorism.  
While normally the presence of individuals from groups identified as different from 
oneself will lead to improved relations and a process of de-exotification in the minds of 
dominant parties guilty of ‘othering,’ the people of France are not experiencing such a process.  166
Instead, the increased presence of Muslims in France, which already is home to the largest 
Muslim minority of any Western European state, has exacerbated tensions between Muslims and 
non-Muslims and resulted in increased sentiments of Islamophobia among white middle-class 
French citizens.  The process of exacerbated tensions, derived from the cultural and religious 167
differences over issues such as gender-equality, religious tolerance, secularity, and essential 
freedoms, has resulted in a situation which falls under the predictions of Threat and Conflict 
Theory.  
This chapter will begin with an analysis of the existing psychological theories on contact 
with out-groups. This analysis is necessary to explain why the French situation predisposes 
166 Seth K. Jolly and Gerald M. DiGusto, “Xenophobia and Immigrant Contact: French Public Attitudes towards 
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France towards a negative and inflammatory reaction to increased levels of migrants and 
refugees. Following the general theory will be a comparison with the French historical case and 
an explanation of why their history, their values, and their culture all demonstrate a dynamic 
with the beliefs of Islam which lend themselves more to threat and conflict than reconciliation. 
After the general set up will be a look first at the reactions to Muslim immigration more 
generally, followed by a focus on the facts, framing, and results of the European Refugee Crisis 
on France. Finally, as with previous chapters, a final section will provide analysis and discussion 
concerning the value of mass Muslim immigration as a catalyzing factor supporting the rise of 
the FN as an accepted populist political party. 
 
Relevant Theory on Interactions between In-Groups and Out Groups 
Gordon Allport addresses the issue of xenophobia and the possible solution to such 
prejudice in his Contact Theory. His proposition of Contact Theory states that proximity and 
healthy interactions between in-group and out-group members are likely to foster increased 
harmony and understanding over time.  His belief stems from psychological research stating 168
that xenophobic prejudices are derived in large part from the designation of something as 
unknown and exotic.  Therefore, given time and contact with those originally dehumanized 169
because of their mystery, inter-group similarities are discovered which help to disabuse the 
in-group of the “negative stereotypes” imposed on the out-group.  In coming to know 170
something, fears stemming from uncertainty disappear and are replaced with rational knowledge 
168 Jolly, and DiGiusto, 465. 
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and understanding. This mirrors the trends found in society that higher levels of education are 
correlated with decreased ‘othering’ and baseless hatred.   171
Allport does recognize that proximity and interaction alone do not for certain result in 
decreased xenophobic sentiments. To have contact theory function, the two groups must interact 
in peaceful ways, without experiencing any symbolic or realistic threats from one another.  Part 172
of being able to know something comes from the finding of common ground and beliefs between 
peoples. When the differences that separate people come not from physically non-threatening 
features, but from symbolically irreconcilable divisions and realistic threats to life and property, 
the increased rate of interactions can serve not as a mitigating element but as an exacerbating 
one.  
Several major theories have arisen to address these possible shortcomings in Allport’s 
Contact Theory. These theories focus on three forms of threat perceptions leading to prejudice 
which are particularly applicable to the relations between French and Muslims. One major theory 
which contradicts Allport’s somewhat optimistic contact theory is known as Integrated Threat 
Theory, which proposed that prejudices arise from four types of threat.  This theory has been 173
updated in recent years as two of the threat forms, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes 
were determined to be products of the other two threat categories.  The new Intergroup Threat 174
Theory (ITT) proposed by Walter Stephan, Ybarra, and Mosu, focuses on two types of perceived 
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threats to make the assertion that individuals in the in-group who perceive the presence of a 
threat posed by an out-group to the well-being and prosperity of the in-group will react to 
increased interaction with increased levels of anxiety and fear. The two forms of perceived 
threats maintained by this theory are realistic threats and symbolic threats. 
Realistic threats were first explored under the assumptions posed in Realistic Conflict 
Theory (RCT). They refer to the concerns of an in-group of physical quantifiable danger 
presented by the introduction of a less establish and less privileged out-group. Realistic fears can 
manifest from fear of job security, fear of violent action against the in-group, or destruction of 
material property belonging to the in-group.  Fears of safety and material prosperity are 175
commonly associated with increased levels of prejudice. For Europe in general, anti-Muslim 
prejudice is focused primarily on this form of threat in the framing of Muslims as a threat to job 
security and a catalyst for increased crime rates.   176
The second perceived threat considered by Intergroup Threat Theory is that of perceived 
symbolic threat. Symbolic threats are seen as threatening differences in cultural norms, 
traditions, or tightly held values between groups.  For the purposes of this paper, that would be 177
referring to the threat posed by the hyper-religiosity of Islam vis ​à​ vis French commitment to 
secularism. A perceived symbolic threat occurs when a dominant group determines that an 
out-group’s cultural and ideological values present a danger to the continued supremacy of the 
dominant group’s ideology. While this threat does not directly suppose the introduction of 
physical harm as a result of the encroaching of an outgroup, it does focus on the ability of 
foreign and exotic cultures to change the atmosphere and assault the cultural values of the 
175 Stephan and Stephan, 25. 
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established in-group.  The fear inherent in this threat comes from a sense of pride in one’s faith 178
and culture. To have that culture threatened by encroaching cosmopolitanism is one of the 
driving forces behind the support for the FN.   179
While not a part of ITT directly, another perceived threat relevant to the French case 
against immigration is the Terrorism Threat Theory (TTT). Going beyond physical damages and 
deprivations of leisure and opportunity, and solidifying the differences in values, TTT focuses on 
an in-group’s belief that the out-group is capable of committing extensive acts of violence with 
the intention being loss of life and/or damage of property on a significant scale.  This theory 180
came into prominence following the events of 9/11, as terrorism became a primary associated to 
physical safety.  While Muslims themselves are not directly associated with Terrorism theory, 181
Islam, or more accurately the fundamentalist interpretation which Europeans tend to prescribe to 
all Muslims, is perceived to encourage the taking of life en masse through acts of terror.  This 182
perceived threat to the safety of a community is derived from genuine threats posed by 
fundamentalism but is likely to become a framed threat as terrorism is often politicized once the 
discourse goes beyond the physical events. By associating terrorism with a specific out-group, a 
political movement can gain support by harnessing the resulting anger as the public designates a 
specific group as responsible for their anxiety.  183
Beyond the notions of perceived threats and their ability to instill grounded prejudice in 
the in-group, the topic of immigration in general poses a possible source of anxiety for any 
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nation. This is because the introduction of change to a previous stable situation often forms 
feelings of uncertainty. Immigration is particularly significant in analyzing the reactions of the 
government as immigration is a type of fear that can be framed and politicized to promote certain 
political and social changes and preferences.  Unlike natural disasters and other potential 184
sources of anxiety, immigration does not pose an inherent threat by its existence. Immigration 
can indeed be construed as a positive element in the adding of new cultures, ideas, and 
advancements to society. However, political parties often make decisions on the ease and value 
of immigration a partisan matter, and for those using immigration as a threat, the anxiety they 
can instill in the public directly benefits their platform through the exacerbation of anxious 
sentiments. This anxiety leads to individuals seeking out political elites who present themselves 
as capable of addressing the causes of anxiety.  The other side to this association is that 185
politicians and leaders are more likely to adopt hardline, authoritarian policies regarding issues 
of immigration and security when anxiety becomes a widespread sentiment. 
To briefly review xenophobic populism, the primary source of support garnered by the 
newest wave of populist movements in Europe is that of xenophobic sentiment and the ability of 
populist leaders to frame a designated ‘other’ as a threat to the established safety and security of 
society. Immigration, when paired with pre-existing prejudices and sentiments of fear and hatred, 
creates the perfect scapegoat for populist rhetoricians to use in establishing the source of 
common troubles of the people like job scarcity and in the case of Islam, fear of terrorism.  186
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Why French-Islamic relations adhere to Threat Theories 
As addressed in the introduction, France is home to the largest Muslim minority 
population of any European nation, with approximately 10% of the Muslim refugees in Europe 
being housed in France.  This significant influx of visibly different peoples into France 187
exacerbated tensions in the readjustment of standard living and the exposure to Islamic practices. 
This issue became particularly pronounced when the Muslim migrants transitioned from 
practicing their faith in cellars to practicing in the public eye with the transition from temporary 
workers to citizens of France.  When changes are made to the standard living styles of 188
individuals, anxiety is likely to occur. ​Anxious Politics: Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening 
World​ specifically addresses the fears and concerns brought on by mass immigration in several 
of its chapters, and France herself has experienced mass influxes of Muslim immigrants at 
multiple times throughout her history under the governance of the Fifth Republic. 
Muslim immigrants have always faced difficulties in gaining French citizenship. From 
the outset, Muslims were viewed with suspicion concerning their religious views and practices 
and were persecuted with regard to their efforts to integrate into French society. “In practice, an 
Algerian who sought citizenship under French civil law had to renounce his local status, 
effectively requiring him to abandon Islam.”  The severity of the requirements to gain French 189
citizenship led to insignificant numbers of Algerian immigrants successfully gaining French 
citizenship. “Between 1865 and 1962 only 7,000 Algerians acquired French citizenship through 
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this naturalization process.”  When compared to the millions of Muslim French citizens the 190
now reside in France, the change in France over the last 57 years becomes all the more vivid. 
The problem that arises comes from France’s continued distrust of Islam and the unshakable 
history of violence and ‘othering’ which has come to define the Franco-Islamic interactions for 
nearly two centuries.  191
As has been addressed by multiple policial scientists and historians, this large minority 
population is particularly difficult for France due to the various values and ideals held at the 
heart of the French identity. Unlike her European counterparts, France has held rigid in several 
observances dating back to colonial times. Among these are the commitment to secularism, the 
universal values of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and the belief that to be French is to abide by 
the cultural norms listed above. Against these values, the perceived zealous nature of Muslims 
was seen as a threat to France’s liberal commitment to the removal of religious observance from 
public spaces.  
How does the influx of Muslims provide a perceived, realistic threat to the average 
middle class French citizen? For one, the increase in underprivileged Muslims in France was 
quickly framed by the FN and other conservative parties as a threat to job security and the 
reasons behind periods of high unemployment in France.  The 1990s saw increased 192
scapegoating of the Muslim population as the reasons behind exacerbated unemployment in 
France, and was championed strongly by the FN.  Furthermore, the French period of 193
colonialism cemented certain perceptions of Muslims and their faith in the French memory, 
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including associations with violence and laziness, enabling negative stereotypical depictions of 
Muslims as threats to public safety and prosperity.  194
 
Going back to colonial perceptions, the French have viewed Islam as a threat to French 
republican values since the colonization of Algeria forced increased interactions between the two 
groups. The hyper-religiosity observed to be part of the Islamic faith, represented by the wearing 
of religious garments and the perceived fanatical belief in the power and guidance of their lord 
left the French unsettled. This zealous nature of Muslims directly conflicts with French 
secularism, as made into law in 1905. Additionally, the differences in the ways that Muslim men 
and women are treated presents another symbolic threat to French liberal values of equality and 
freedom. The unequal treatment of women evokes fears that Islamification undermines the 
values of universalism and equality the French pride themselves on supporting.   195
Islam has long been associated with acts of terrorism going back to the usage of terrorist 
shootings and bombings in the Algerian Revolutions by members of the FLN.   196
 
France’s Handling of Muslim Immigration from 1960 to 2015: A Failure to Integrate 
Seeing as how French society has associated Islam and Muslims with all forms of 
prevalent threats for generations, it is understandable that France’s efforts to integrate Muslims 
into French society has been lackluster. Following the initial refusal of France to allow more than 
a few thousand Algerians to acquire French citizenship before 1962, France would go on to host 
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the largest proportional minority of Muslims in Western Europe.  This substantial change in 197
France’s exposure to Muslims promoted anxiety among the French populace, particularly in the 
post-Algerian Revolution environment of the 70s and 80s.  The shift away from the 198
European-heavy migrant pool in the 60s to the non-European majority from 1982 onwards 
changed the discourse on immigration as it took on a cultural and racial element.  199
Politicians are incentivized to present themselves as capable to address threats to the 
public in order to take advantage of the tendency for anxious citizens to exhibit increased trust in 
those seen as able to remove present threats.  Following the relaxed nature of the Mitterrand 200
government, public unrest surrounding the increasing visibility of Muslims and the 
administration's failure to address illegal immigration made authoritarian stances on immigration 
favorable positions to take.  At the time, Jean-Marie Le Pen spoke out against the government, 201
claiming that their inaction was the cause of the unemployment and crime issues facing France in 
the 1980s and 90s.  This stance, which he and the FN had cultivated since their shift towards a 202
populist image, assisted in casting the FN not only as the outsider to politics but as the expert on 
immigration.  
It was in response to Mitterrand’s relaxed immigration legislation and treatment of illegal 
immigrants that the FN’s stance on French national identity formed as staunchly 
anti-cosmopolitan. The FN believed that French nationality was a status that needed to be earned 
197 ​Pew Research Center 
198 Rydgren, 161. 
199 Ibid, 161. 
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through commitment to the values of French republican society, and that only through complete 
compliance with French values can one become truly French.  203
The governments of Chirac and Sarkozy rose in a post-Mitterrand environment which 
was characterized by increasingly visible distrust and fear of the growing Muslim population 
which had been allowed to proliferate under the previous socialist regime. Following Mitterrand, 
an election followed between Jacques Chirac and Jean-Marie Le Pen, and while Chirac won and 
proclaimed it a victory against xenophobia, his passiveness in suppressing Islamophobic 
sentiments positioned him more as an observer than any form of champion for the oppressed.  204
It was under his governance that his fellow conservative counterpart, Nicolas Sarkozy, began to 
influence the treatment of Muslims in France through increased Islamophobic rhetoric and the 
passing of legislation predicated on French republican values, but targeting the Muslim minority 
asymmetrically.   205
In 2004, The French government instituted a ban on the wearing of the hijab in schools 
and framed it as a defense of French secularism: banning religious emblems in public spaces.  206
In reality, the action to outlaw the wearing of visible religious garbs in centers of education of 
uniquely targeted at Muslims as the wearing of small religious emblems was permitted, leaving 
Christians and Jews relatively unaffected by the new law.  “It signalled that Muslim culture 207
was to be subjected to regulation and restriction, opening a space within which zealotry and 
racism could find expression.”  The liberalism of secularism as it was initially intended had 208
203 Davies, 64. 
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been corrupted to limit the visible presence of Islam in public spaces, a deliberate move to 
prohibit Islam in France. 
The year after the controversial headscarf ban, France received a reminder of the violence 
that the Muslim minority was capable of when the ​banlieues​ of Paris, and other French cities 
experienced widespread violent riots.  The October Riots of 2005 demonstrated the failure of 209
French immigration policy as the Arab descendents of immigrants engaged in mass destruction 
of property.  This uprising was founded on sentiments of resentment in opposition to police 210
brutality and Islamic discrimination, which had become increasingly more present in France over 
the past few years.  Notably, these riots came following the headscarf bans imposed on Muslim 211
school children and comments by Nicolas Sarkozy, characterizing the inhabitants of the 
banlieues​ as “scum” or “riffraff.”  These inflammatory actions and proclamations by the 212
government, along with the high rates of unemployment and racial discrimination, incited the 
most violent uprising in France since May of 1968.  213
Later, in 2010, another religiously targeted law was enacted, banning the wearing of 
garments covering the face in public.  The wearing of the burqa and niqab were targeted as 214
threats to public security, as well as symbols of gender oppression. In this way, Conservatives 
and members of the far-right validated the removal and oppression of religious expression for the 
few Muslim women implicated by this law.  215
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Sarkozy’s framing of Muslim immigrants as a threat to republican values, paired with 
new legislation and the riots of 2005 led to increasing fears and anti-immigrant sentiments. By 
2010, 38% of French citizen polled saw immigration as a positive influence on France, while 
55% saw illegal immigration as a contributor to increased crime rates.  216
This series of Islamophobic reactions to the influx of Muslim migrants has been 
perpetuated since the Algerian Revolution. Beginning with the brutalization and murder of 
Algerian nationalists, growing in public support with the increasing visibility of Islam in the 
public sector, and gaining political legitimacy with the continued actions of politicians to secure 
the public’s trust by passing and promoting authoritarian security measures and condemning the 
presence of Islam in the ​banlieues​. This history is the context provided for the framing and 
handling of the modern European Refugee Crisis; a portrayal of Muslims as a threat to society 
which has been legitimized as a threat by established, centrist governments. 
 
European Refugee Crisis 
The European Refugee Crisis began in the summer of 2015 and by September of ‘15, 
264,000 refugees had applied for asylum in European countries.  The past few years have seen 217
steady and tremendous increases in the number of asylum seekers with most settling in Germany, 
Italy, and northern European countries. For France, who is already home to approximately 10% 
of Europe’s Muslim population, the increased burden of refugees has incited outrage and 
increased anti-immigrant rhetoric on the part of the FN and other conservative elements.  218
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The two contextual pieces which differentiate the immigration experienced in France 
from 2015 onwards are the quantity of Muslim asylum seekers and the renewed emergence of 
terrorism in France from Charlie Hebdo onwards. The violence inherent in the French response 
to the treatment of Muslim immigrants has been an established practice since well before the 
European Refugee Crisis began in 2015. The first instances of this violence going back to the 
murder of Algerian nationalists in France by Parisian police officers in the later years of the 
wars, the number of which will likely never be fully determined.  As Muslim presence became 219
more visible with the practicing of Islam in increasingly public spaces, it became apparent that 
the French population was negatively affected by perceived threats attributed to the increasing 
Muslim minority. This perceived sense of threat continues to frame public perceptions of Muslim 
immigrants and, when combined with the added fear of renewed mass terrorism, offers an 
opportunity for the far-right to make increased gains in support. 
Marine Le Pen has framed the influx of new refugees much in the same manner she 
always had; Muslims represent a threat to French jobs, ideals, and safety, and France must not 
continue to accept further immigrants into a country which has already become saturated with 
Muslims over the past several decades. The fact that the majority of the asylum seekers come 
from Syria, which has been directly associated with the November Paris attacks through the 
presence of ISIS, is an important connection.   220
 
 
 
219 Lorcin, 117. 
220 Wolfreys, 22. 
86 
Framing the Refugee Crisis to Benefit the Front National 
As with most populist political parties, the Front National (FN) is staunchly 
anti-immigration, with a particular focus on opposing the influx of Muslim immigrants from the 
Middle East and North Africa. Chapters two and three have already discussed how the FN gained 
much of its initial following and support from running on a platform which proclaimed France 
for the French. Jean-Marie Le Pen vehemently opposed the influx of Arab immigrants from 
before the creation of the FN and cemented those beliefs into the foundation of the party in 1972.
 While elements of biological racism and anti-semitism have disappeared from the party’s 221
rhetoric under the guidance of Marine Le Pen, the anti-Islamic sentiments have been preserved. 
When immigration is discussed as a threat to French values, it is immigration from North Africa 
which dominates the discourse, rather than intra-European immigration.  The Refugee Crisis, 222
and frankly all immigration by Muslims from the Middle-East and North Africa serve the 
platform of the FN as a visible and easily discriminated scapegoat. From the increase in Arab 
immigrants in the mid-twentieth century, to the modern refugee crisis, the increasing population 
of Muslims has fueled the FN and is a major mechanism through which populism is strengthened 
by Islamophobia. 
Xenophobic populism often rises up when a majority in-group of a society perceives their 
position as becoming threatened by a proportionally increasing minority population which they 
differentiate from themselves through a number of means.  France’s uniquely stubborn 223
interpretation of French identity allows populist parties to draw upon cultural heritage to a 
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222 Daniel Stockemer, ​The Front National in France: Continuity and Change Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine 
Le Pen​ (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017): . 
223 DeAngelis, 83. 
87 
greater extent than normally would be possible. This is because, while not universally accepted 
by the French, the common discourse on French national identity states that anyone can become 
French, but to become French is to abandon one’s own identity in exchange for complete 
adherence to the French ideals.  Thanks to the perceived threats presented by Muslim 224
immigration and refugees, it becomes easy for Marine Le Pen and the FN to claim republican 
values in their defense of French identity throughout the 1990s.   225
 
Conclusion 
Because the French perception of Muslims and Islam has been saturated with threat 
prejudice from colonial past, political portrayal, and media portrayal, The increased level of 
interaction does not subvert negative stereotypes, but instead exacerbates fear of physical and 
ideological damage to France brought on by Muslim Immigrants. The FN uses this fear to grow 
and solidify their voter base, consisting in large part of uneducated, unemployed individuals, as 
well as those believing in the singular version of French identity. The FN scapegoats Muslims as 
the cause of unemployment, generalizes them as all in adherence with the fundamentalists, and 
blames immigration as the cause of terrorism and deems it a security risk.  226
As demonstrated during the 2017 Presidential election, Marine Le Pen and the FN might 
have a chance at obtaining and maintaining a strong plurality in France, but are unlikely to 
overcome the second round majority barrier as the majority of the French public still views the 
FN as an extremist, anti-democratic, heir to fascism. The real threat laid out by the information 
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accumulated here is the threat of normalization of hatred. While the FN might never hold the 
presidency, both Jean-Marie and Marine have, in their times, applied pressure through their 
movement upon the presiding government to initiate and enact laws which lean far-right of 
center. From the Security act to the consideration of removing citizenship from natural 
dual-citizens, Hollande considered significant authoritarian responses to the growing discontent 
in France with the increasing levels of immigrant presence and terrorism.  
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Conclusion 
 
Fear is a powerful motivation. Humans detest the feeling of not being in control of their 
reality. The presence of perceived threats or violent disasters often focuses the mind on its own 
mortality and catalyzes it to seek out way to mitigate the risk to its safety. This instinct of the 
human body to sek safety from threats is, on its own, a valuable characteristic which keeps 
humans alive. When an unframed disaster such as a hurricane or a school shooting occurs, it is 
healthy to react in fear. However, when the fear that one experiences is based on perceived 
threats of violence, regardless of the actual level of threat present, then that fear inhibits the mind 
from successfully and logically processing information. To have an irrational fear of something 
or someone is to sacrifice the ability to reason and logically come to understand the source of 
that fear. Additionally, as human beings seek to control their fears through the gathering of 
information, it is fairly simple for sources of information to impart their biases unto the fearful 
individuals.  
The first take away from this paper must be the understanding that xenophobia can be a 
powerful factor in the political calculations of a nation, especially when the nation’s history has 
formed around an ethno-cultural identity as is the case with France. At the very heart of the 
issue, France’s colonial roots have engrained in her a pervasive Islamophobic sentiment which 
influences political discourse on all sides of the political spectrum. This history of oppression 
and violence has created lasting negative stereotypes which have come to be validated on the 
logic of French republicanism. It is sobering to understand the reality of the corruption of French 
universalism and secularism. The politicization of these liberal policies has transformed their 
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purpose from one of tolerance and protection, to one of intolerance and targeted religious censor. 
Because French perceptions of Islam have been integrally biased since the period of colonization 
in the early-1880s, the ability of the French to logically consider the actual impacts of Islam on 
the French republican experience is impeded. Specifically, the hyper-religiosity and perceived 
intolerance than has come to be associated with the faith of Islam, frames it as inherently 
antagonistic toward the central pillars of French society.  
French adherence to their values of ​liberte, egalite, and fraternite​ are considered to be 
necessarily universal; anyone who comes to France has an obligation to adhere to these policies 
of tolerance and acceptance. These values are the foundations of French liberalism and have 
been enacted to safeguard the rights of the French. However, previously existing animosity 
between the French and Algerians has transformed values of tolerance into weapons of 
normalization. The FN under Marine Le Pen has made stride in the political realm because she 
has convince many in France that her policies come not from a place of hatred for Muslims, but 
from a desire to protect France and her liberal ideals of tolerance and freedom. 
The Front Nationale has experienced significant increases in support in the decades since 
its creation in 1972. While at first Jean-Marie Le Pen experienced in-party schisms and pitifully 
low levels of support, the party has evolved to appeal to French citizens regardless of traditional 
political affiliations. The party has gained attention and support through their incendiary remarks 
on the state of the nation of France, often relying on the scapegoating of the Muslim immigrant 
population in France as the source of threats to France’s republican ideology, safety and 
well-being, and job security for the average Frenchman. From their inception to now, it has been 
the ability of the FN leadership to capitalize upon Islamophobic sentiment which has aided in the 
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rise to prominence and elevation from fringe to party-politics. Beyond their own electoral 
success, the FN has experienced great success through the normalization of their beliefs among 
French political elites and the general public. In fact, the most dangerous element of the FN’s 
rise to prominence might not be the potential for a FN candidate to rise to the position of 
President of France. The most dangerous implication of this paper, is that the FN will be able to 
spread their influence and policies to the extent that their policies will become normalized and 
accepted by centrist party politicians. 
The open racism of Nicolas Sarkozy and the reactionary authoritarian policies of Francois 
Hollande illustrate a break from traditional centrist party lines. Where under Mitterrand and de 
Gaulle, policies remained polarized on traditional issues of market economics and social welfare, 
the new debate has been guided by the Front National: the debate between isolation and 
integration. By driving politics towards debates on the presence of, and threats posed by, ethnic 
minorities, the FN has cemented itself at the heart of party politics and successfully framed itself 
not as an extreme-right, fanatical party, but a party focused on protecting French values for the 
French. By choosing the growing Muslim minority as their scapegoat, the FN has successfully 
capitalized on the perceived threats of Islam held by many of the French public. The French 
public, through their consumption of threatening media in times of crisis, has shifted their 
preferences which in turn influence the centrist parties of France and provide for a cycle of 
increasing Islamophobic sentiments, support for the FN, and normalization of their authoritarian, 
xenophobic security and immigration policies. 
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